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FROM VULNERABILHTY TO VOICE:
APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Catherine J. Ross*
INTRODUCrION
T HE notion that children are defined by their "peculiar vulnerabili-
ties" dates back to Blackstone, whose terminology has long re-
stricted children's legal status.1 In general, the legal system has
equated children's vulnerability with ineligibility for the full panoply
of rights accorded to adults.2 A long pedigree attaches to the tradition
of depriving children of certain rights while assuming that constricting
children's liberty did not harm them. Blackstone posited that the
"very disabilities [of minors] are privileges .... ,,3 By "disabilities,"
Blackstone was of course alluding to perceived differences in skills
and judgment distinguishing the average child from the average
adult.4 Blackstone went on to conclude that such vulnerabilities re-
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. B.A., Yale College,
1971; Ph.D., Yale University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987. -The author thanks
Boston College Law School for supporting this research, Marya Rose and Elisa Cogs-
well for their dedicated research assistance, and Martha Minow, Aviam Soifer, and
Bernardine Dohrn for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. I William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 452 (1992) (not-
ing that children have certain legal "disabilities"); see also, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 634 (1979) (recognizing that children's constitutional rights cannot be equated
with those of adults because of "the peculiar vulnerability of children").
2. The Supreme Court has "sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical
and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive
area of constitutionally protected rights." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757
(1982) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
3. I Blackstone, supra note 1, at 452. Blackstone actually uses the term "infants,"
but applies it to all children who have not yet achieved the age of majority, a status
which he notes is achieved at different ages depending on the sex of the child and the
purpose being considered. Id. at 448-52. Thus, in England during Blackstone's era, a
12-year-old boy could take the oath of allegiance, and at 14 could consent to mar-
riage, choose a guardian, or execute a testament disposing of his personal estate, but
did not achieve full majority until age 21. Id. at 451. A girl, in contrast, could be
betrothed at age seven, but could not give or withhold consent to marriage until age
12, when she could also dispose of her personal estate "if proved to have sufficient
discretion." Id. at 451. At 14, a girl could choose a guardian, and achieved majority
for all purposes at age 21. Id. at 451.
4. The distinctions between children and adults that we take for granted were
less entrenched in the 18th century. See generally Philippe Aries, Centuries of Child-
hood: A Social History of Family Life (Robert Baldick trans., 1962) (arguing that the
contemporary wester concept of childhood as a differentiated status, characterized
by traits such as innocence, developed between the 16th and 18th centuries); Law-
rence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800 (1977) (tracing theevolution of the family from 1450 and focusing on issues including parent-child
relations).
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quire that children be held "secure... from hurting themselves by
their own improvident acts."'5
"
This Article proposes to turn Blackstone's conclusion on its head.
The author argues that children's peculiar vulnerabilities do not justify
a regime of benevolent paternalism interpreted at the unreined discre-
tion of judges. Instead, these perceived vulnerabilities provide the
foundation for enhancing legal rights already accorded to children; in
particular, children's vulnerabilities support their need for appointed
counsel in civil litigation.6 Courts frequently decide matters affecting
children's essential interests without providing an adequate opportu-
nity for them to present their views, preferences, or justifications.
This Article seeks to enhance children's claims to appointed counsel
in civil litigation affecting essential interests-where no constitutional
or statutory right to counsel currently exists-by building on precisely
the vulnerabilities previously used to minimize a child's right to be
heard in, court. Although many authors have argued for children's
rights to counsel based on moral and philosophical imperatives, the
author of this Article aims to ground this right in the existing jurispru-
dence governing claims to counsel.
The "equality embodied by rights claims" is, as one leading scholar
has observed, "an equality of atention... that makes those in power
at least listen."7" In our society, the right to be heard may be rendered
meaningless without access to counsel, and even more so for those
whose particular vulnerabilities make it extremely difficult for them to
marshal arguments on their own behalf. "[T]he adversary system
functions best and most fairly only when all parties are represented by
5. I Blackstone, supra note 1, at 452.
6. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627-28 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that children may be entitled to more procedural protection than adults in the
context of psychiatric commitment because "childhood is a particularly vulnerable
time of life" and the results of erroneous decisions may be more harmful to children
than to adults); see also Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of
Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 Child Dev. 1589,
1595-96 (1982) (finding that children as young as nine years old are "competent" to
direct their own medical treatment).
7. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and Ameri-
can Law 297 (1990). The scope of the substantive rights accorded to children is be-
yond the extent of this Article. The focus here is limited to the right to be heard
through counsel in the effort to exercise recognized substantive claims, or any cogni-
zable claims that such counsel may be able to fashion. This Article emphasizes that
the latter, the ability of competent counsel to craft workable claims to rights previ-
ously unrecognized or claims addressing uncompensated wrongs, constitutes an im-
portant justification for appointing counsel for litigants whose stories suggest the risk
of real harm but who may not know how to frame a cause of action under law.
In this respect, the author agrees with the suggestion that we first must "be clear
that it makes sense to ascribe rights to children at all before we go on to work out
substantive theories as to the rights they should be accorded." Neff MacCormack,
Children's Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Right, 62 Archives for Phil. L. & Soc.
Phil. 3, 20 (1976). The author is indebted to Katherine Hunt Federle for sharing with
her Professor MacCormack's article.
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competent counsel."8' Indeed, the absence of counsel in an adversary
system severely diminishes the odds of justice being served.
The intellectual boundaries of rights theory tend to follow practical
imperatives arising from real world problems. In the case of children,
practice and theory converge neatly. Children's autonomy claims
emerge as children mature, creating an expanding category of de-
mands that cry out to be heard.9 Nonetheless, even as children
demonstrate a practical need to be heard, separate and apart from
their parents, on diverse issues regularly played out in courts, children
still remain perhaps the most marginal political group in our society.
The reasons for their marginal status are many, including traditional
patriarchal conceptions of the family and an ideology of family privacy
that reinforces the rights of parents in preference to those of their
children. Children also lack a franchise or other means of affecting
decision makers.
This Article argues that existing jurisprudence actually supports the
appointment of counsel for children. The logic of decisions interpret-
ing the rights of other marginal and powerless groups-coupled with
the extension of rights in the noncivil domains of juvenile justice-
provide ample precedents supporting the appointment of counsel for
children in civil proceedings.
Children are unique because, unlike adults, the law does not allow
them to remove themselves from an unsatisfactory environment when
their needs remain unfulfilled. Despite sensational press reports, they
cannot "divorce" their parents, 10 except by committing the status of-
fense" of running away, which could result in their own confinement.
Similarly, until children reach a certain age, they are required to at-
tend school; they cannot tell the school to "take this job and shove it,"
adapting the language of worker discontent. 2 Resulting pressures
often mount until the problems surrounding or emanating from the
child end up before a court of law.
8. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the criminal justice system).
9. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that
minor's individual rights claims grow more compelling with age, continuing to expand
during the course of the litigation).
10. See George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K.": A Child's
Right to be Heard, 27 Faro. L.Q. 365, 365 & n.3 (1993) (noting that contrary to reports
in the press, Gregory K. did not seek to divorce his mother, but rather sought to
terminate her parental rights in accordance with state law so that the foster family
with which he had lived for several years could adopt him).
11. "Status offenses" are activities that violate laws only because they are engaged
in by children. Virginia J. Hopkins, Baudy Ballads and MTV: In Juvenile Crimes the
More Things Change the More They Stay the Same, W. Va. Law., Nov. 1995, at 14, 15.
Examples include missing school, staying out late, and "incorrigibility" reported by
parents. Id.
12. Johnny Paycheck, Take This Job and Shove It, on Johnny Paycheck Golden
Classics (Hollywood 1987).
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By taking seriously the notion that children are persons under the
law, and applying to the case of children precedents that guide the
exercise of judicial discretion in appointing counsel for indigent adults
and other petitioners to the courts, this Article frames a theoretical
basis for appointing counsel for children in a wide variety of circum-
stances. The author proceeds on the premise that law for children
should not result in a separate jurisprudential system-a "children's
law" which quickly deteriorates into the disparaging "kiddie law"-
but should instead rest squarely in our common law. Appointments
of counsel for children that are predicated on principles drawn from
the mainstream of our jurisprudence will have a sounder basis than
appointments made at a judge's unguided discretion or as a result of
unarticulated value preferences.
Part I of this Article provides examples of the types of civil cases in
which children may need independent counsel. This part argues that
children have pressing needs for representation in a variety of matters
where the facts or the underlying issues provide transparent evidence
that the parents do not speak for the child in the particular circum-
stance. Part II analyzes judicial views concerning the nature of juve-
nile vulnerability. Part III argues that an analysis of the factors that
guide judicial discretion in appointing counsel for indigent adults
reveals that if those factors were applied to children, they would fre-
quently point toward appointment of counsel. Part IV turns to a spe-
cial vulnerability of children-the view expressed by the Supreme
Court that children are analogous to prisoners because they are al-
ways in someone's custody. This Article argues that if followed to its
logical conclusion, this line of reasoning necessarily supports appoint-
ment of counsel for children, especially if viewed in conjunction with
the First Amendment right of petition and the concomitant right of
access to the courts as applied to prisoners. Finally, part V explores
why the argument in parts I through IV supports the appointment of
counsel who would follow normative rules governing attorney-client
relations as closely as possible in representing child clients.
Existing Rights and Unaddressed Needs. Children have a recog-
nized right to counsel in certain types of judicial proceedings. 3 The
basic fundamental right to counsel is grounded in the United States
Constitution and applied to juveniles by judicial interpretation. For
13. See American Bar Association Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of
Children and Their Families, America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for
Legal Action 4 (1993) [hereinafter America's Children at Risk]. This report notes
that resources for and public commitment to providing counsel for children may vary
with the source of the claim to counsel, depending on whether the claim stems from a
clear constitutional right, a federal or state statute, or the child's essential interests
absent a constitutional or statutory right to counsel. Id. The author of this Article was
Vice Chair of the Working Group that issued America's Children At Risk and was the
principal author of that report.
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example, in any delinquency proceeding that may lead to incarcera-
tion, minors have a constitutional right to appointed counsel.' 4
Certain statutes also create children's entitlements to counsel. Fed-
eral law, for example, requires representation for children in some ju-
dicial proceedings arising out of allegations of abuse, neglect, or
dependency, such as petitions to terminate parental rights.15 In addi-
tion, some states have created statutory rights to counsel for children
in certain substantive categories of civil litigation, such as custody pro-
ceedings' 6 and petitions for a court order to bypass parental consent
requirements for abortions.1 7 In Massachusetts, for example, separate
statutes impose piecemeal requirements that counsel be appointed for
children in need of services, including those charged with truancy, run-
ning away, or chronic disobedience.18 These statutes also apply in
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (finding a right to representation by coun-
sel in juvenile adjudications that can result in confinement); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 557-62 (1966) (finding right to representation by counsel in proceedings
to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and be tried as an adult in criminal court). Recog-
nition of an affirmative right to appointed counsel should not be confused with attain-
ment of that right. Many children who have a right to appointed counsel remain
unrepresented, even when the source of the right lies in the Constitution, as in pro-
ceedings to adjudicate delinquency. See Report of the American Bar Association Ju-
venile Justice Center, Juvenile Law Center, & Youth Law Center, A Call for Justice:
An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency
Proceedings 7-8, 21 (1996).
15. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (1994) (requiring appointment of a guardian
ad litem for abused or neglected children in judicial proceedings, pursuant to the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5118)); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "I
Know the Child Is My Client, But Who Am I?", 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1917, 1921-22
(1996) (discussing the "persistent disregard" for appointment of guardian ad litem
required by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g)).
16. Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judi-
cial Proceedings, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 255, 269-70, 270 n.58 (1991) (noting that some
states require appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child in all contested custody
cases (citing Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.045; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17-a (1983))). But
see Katherine H. Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Cus-
tody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523, 1552-53, 1552 nn.171-
74, 1553 nn.175-76 (1994) (noting that only nine states mandate appointment of a
representative-whether attorney or guardian ad litem-for the child in divorce cus-
tody proceedings, and that even those states require the appointment only if certain
conditions precedent exist).
17. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 112, § 12S (Law. Co-op. 1991); see also Marvin
R. Ventrell, Rights and Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relation-
ship, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 259, 268 (1995) (finding that it is increasingly common for
children to be represented in cases involving health care as well as private custody
disputes and proceedings concerning adoption, guardianship, welfare benefits, and
school law).
18. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 39F (Law Co-op. 1994) (providing right to
counsel for children in need of services); ch. 119, § 29 (requiring court to appoint
counsel for children unable to retain counsel in hearings involving petition by the
state for guardianship of the child or commitment to the custody of a state agency);
ch. 210, § 3(b) (stating that the court shall appoint counsel for child in care of state or
licensed child care agency to represent child in adoption proceedings); ch. 112, § 12S
(providing right to counsel for minors in abortion proceedings); ch. 201, § 34 (stating
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cases where the state seeks to remove a child from a parent's custody
or to place the child for adoption without the parent's consent, and in
cases where the minor seeks judicial authorization to obtain an abor-
tion without parental consent.19
There is, however, little consensus among the states. Many states
remain silent even where other states have enacted statutes providing
a right to counsel. Thus, it can be said that existing state statutes pro-
viding children with a right to appointed counsel provide a skeletal
road map of the situations where children need lawyers but may not
have them. The framework proposed by this Article can be used to
obtain counsel for children in states that do not currently create a stat-
utory right.
Moreover, the situations identified in the legislation described
above do not exhaust the universe of events in which one might plau-
sibly claim that children need counsel to represent their unique view-
points. This Article proposes to expand children's representation in
civil matters affecting their crucial interests.20 Examples of circum-
stances in which minors have an important or essential stake may in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following: abuse and neglect
proceedings, including proceedings to terminate parental rights; pro-
ceedings contesting custody, visitation, or adoption; hearings regard-
ing status offenses; circumstances involving medical decision making,
including situations such as psychiatric commitment at the request of
parents, judicial proceedings regarding medical procedures such as pe-
titions for abortion without parental consent, and decisions to forgo
painful treatments with uncertain chances of success; and litigation
over conditions of state guardianship, including conditions of confine-
ment in the juvenile justice system, or efforts to be placed in the same
foster home with siblings.2 '
that court may appoint guardian ad litem to represent the legal interests of incompe-
tents); ch. 203, § 31 (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem for minor in
proceeding for the sale or settlement of trust estate); ch. 206, § 30 (requiring court to
appoint guardian ad litem for minor beneficiaries of trust funds prior to making an
order of decree); ch. 210, § 5 (stating that court may appoint guardian ad litem with
power to give or withhold consent in adoption proceedings); ch. 215, § 56B (providing
that court may appoint guardian ad litem in contempt proceedings).
19. See Jinanne S.J. Elder, The Role of Counsel for Children: A Proposal for Ad-
dressing a Troubling Question, Boston BJ., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 6, 6-7 (discussing con-
flicting guidance for counsel's proper role and citing Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-11, 7-12 (1981), Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to
Counsel for Private Parties § 3.1(b)(ii)[b], [c] (1980), and Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.14 (1983)).
20. The following discussion is intended to illustrate the variety of situations in
which children's problems are the subject of civil litigation. Any comprehensive cata-
logue of issues that might arise, or of their relative frequency, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
21. The invited experts who participanted in the Conference on Ethical Issues in
the Representation of Children held December 1-3, 1995 at the Fordham University
School of Law (the "Fordham Conference") recognized the importance of counsel in
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Parameters of the argument. A few qualifications are in order
before this Article embarks on its analysis. First, this Article does not
argue for creating a new "right." The argument here extends the
boundaries of what courts and legislators have traditionally viewed as
a significant legal privilege in the civil context, a privilege expressed in
the wide discretion accorded to state and federal judges to appoint
counsel for the needy.2 2 The author's analysis provides a coherent ba-
sis for expanding the claim of children to the privilege of appointed
counsel by placing this claim within the existing jurisprudence gov-
erning how judges should exercise their discretion to appoint counsel
for adults.
Second, the author argues for extending access to counsel only
when the justice system is already implicated-where a child and his
or her family can be expected to appear before a court in relation to
an identified problem. The author does not propose that counsel be
available to children who wish to transfer disagreements with their
parents from a private, domestic forum to a public forum. Examples
of such disagreements include nonabusive discipline, parental curfews,
conflicts over religious observance, or the classic bedtime dispute.
Disputes that bear a resemblance to arguments over family govern-
ance sometimes do spill over into the public sphere, coming before a
court when family members are unable to resolve or handle their dif-
ferences. In the intrafamily situations discussed in this Article, the
fact that the family's problems are presented in court provides prima
facie evidence that the family's ability to resolve conflict without some
form of litigation has broken down. The author does not advocate the
appointment of counsel, for either minors or adults, in order to pro-
mote or inflame discord within a family that is able to resolve its dis-
agreements internally. Where the state fails to provide a safety valve
for pronounced family discord, however, it seems to verge on the de-
lusional to assume that allowing the resulting tensions to boil over will
strengthen or preserve the embattled family unit. Courts provide a
regulated framework for resolving disputes that have already tran-
scended the ability of the parties to resume more temperate
discussion.
these controversies. See Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301, 1320, 1323 (1996) [here-
inafter Recommendations of the Conference] (part VIII.A.1. & D.1.-2.) (recom-
mending that state law provide lawyers to represent children in abuse and neglect
proceedings, proceedings to terminate parental rights and other foster care proceed-
ings, delinquency cases, status offenses, and mental health commitment cases, and
that, further study be given to whether there should be mandatory appointment of
counsel in other categories of cases, including proceedings disputing custody, visita-
tion, or adoption).
22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) (according federal judges the discretion to
"request an attorney to represent any.., person unable to employ counsel"); N.Y.
Jud. Law § 35 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (providing judges the discretion to appoint
counsel for indigent persons in certain circumstances).
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Finally, while the author accepts the premise that children differ
from adults in fundamental respects, she takes seriously children's au-
tonomy. The author seeks a means to allow children to participate
meaningfully in the process society has selected as the means of last
resort for resolving disputes.23 In this sense, the author aligns herself
with those thinkers who argue that children are entitled to have their
views and experiences given weight by adult decision makers, even in
the face of capacities that differ from those of adults.2 4 After all, it is
the child's world view we are being asked to acknowledge.25
I. CHILDREN NEED COUNSEL IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT
In our adversarial system of justice, the right to be heard is normally
equated with the right to be heard through counsel who can navigate a
complex judicial process. The importance of counsel to children can-
not be overestimated. The Danish novelist Peter Hoeg captures how
difficult it is for children to give voice to their own views, unaccus-
tomed as they are to doing so:
Speaking is not easy. All your life you have listened, or looked as
if you were listening. The living word came down to you, it was not
something you, personally, gave voice to. You spoke only after hav-
ing put up your hand, and when you had been asked a question, and
you said what was certain and correct .... 26
The hurdles to communication by children on their own behalf are
ameliorated by the classic functions of the advocate's craft-listening,
eliciting information, tracking down facts, and using all of those tools
to advance a position.
23. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, arts. 5, 12,
28 I.L.M. 1448, 1459-60, 1461 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (stating that children
should be heard through "a representative" and their views weighed in proportion to
their capacity); Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspec-
tive on Parents' Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747, 1829 (1993) (noting that children's
difference has been distorted to justify adult unwillingness to credit children's exper-
iences, views, and emerging capacity); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43
Harv. Educ. Rev. 487, 507-09 (1973) (finding that the evolving capacity of individual
children should be recognized in legal proceedings).
24. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 23, at 1829 n.363 (challenging "the tacit as-
sumption that children must reason like adults, any more than women must reason
like men, in order to have their views and experiences taken seriously and given
weight in decisions deeply affecting their lives"); Katherine H. Federle, On the Road
to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle,
42 DePaul L. Rev. 983, 985 (1993) (noting that the protective notion of children's
rights fails to acknowledge powerlessness and is flawed by conceding that differing
capacities may justify differentials in rights because "capacity is part of the language
of hierarchy and status, of exclusion and inequality").
25. "Acknowledging" views and experiences is not to be equated with unques-
tioned deference to those views. The issue is initially one of process, and one hopes
that a more sensitive and responsive outcome will follow.
26. Peter Hoeg, Borderliners 218 (1994).
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A. Can Parents Speak for Their Children?
The Supreme Court has expressly stated that the right to represen-
tation is "the essence of justice" for minors as well as for adults.27 In
Kent v. United States28 the Court held that "[t]he right to representa-
tion by counsel is not a formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a
ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of justice."2 9 Although the
Supreme Court's pronouncements on children's rights to counsel are
limited to matters involving delinquent behavior-characterized as
neither criminal nor civil-they inform our discussion of justice in the
civil arena.30 For children, even more than for adults, representation
is always "the essence of justice," precisely because of the unique vul-
nerabilities of children that so often are deemed to strip them of a
need for or right to an independent claim for civil justice.
Although a few states provide a statutory right to counsel in partic-
ular circumstances, many states do not provide such a right. Statutes
authorizing appointment of counsel for children define the categories
of controversies in which children are recognized as needing counsel,
but in which they may nonetheless find themselves without a lawyer.
Legislative silence implies that in many states minors have no statu-
tory right to counsel in hearings in which the state has already inter-
vened, or for which the state has already altered the norm of family
self-governance. Examples of such hearings include: hearings regard-
ing status offenses (activities which violate laws only because engaged
in by children-including failure to attend school or breaking a cur-
few imposed on minors), contested adoptions, or judicial bypass pro-
ceedings for abortions.31 In other instances, the state has reinforced
parental authority with its own, more powerful, brand of authority by
actively intervening in family life to enforce parental decisions. For
example, certain statutes allow the state to detain children in response
to status offenses reported by the parent (including imprecise offenses
such as "incorrigibility") 32 or to provide the machinery to accomplish
27. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (holding that children may not
be transferred from juvenile to criminal court without a hearing in which they are
represented by counsel). Soon after deciding Kent, the Supreme Court held that chil-
dren have a right to counsel in all proceedings in which an adverse finding may result
in incarceration. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
28. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
29. Id at 561.
30. For a discussion of the juvenile justice system inaugurated by Kent and Gault,
see Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary Regime: Punishment and Reha-
bilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996).
31. Minors may also need counsel if they appear before a court in order to resist
medical procedures-including abortions-that their parents or others seek to im-
pose. See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 213-15 (Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (concerning a
16-year-old girl resisting her mother's efforts to obtain an abortion for her).
32. See, e.g., In re Andrew R., 454 N.Y.S.2d 820, 826 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (holding that
13-year-old Andrew was not a person in need of supervision ("PINS") when he cut
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what may turn out to be an inappropriate "voluntary" commitment of
a minor to a psychiatric facility at his or her parents' request. 33
The nonrepresentation of children in such matters is based on a va-
riety of rationales. At the most general level, courts have been loathe
to intrude into the private domain of family life in ways that might be
deemed to challenge parental sovereignty. 4 More specifically, courts
often adhere to a model of family relations that presumes the interests
of parents and children coincide. Courts also frequently assume that
parents seek to maximize the fulfillment of their children's needs and
interests. Furthermore, courts presume that parents are able to iden-
tify their children's needs and interests and, having done so, to articu-
late them effectively on their children's behalf.' Justice Stewart
summarized this doctrine in his statement in Parham v. J.R .36 that
"[f]or centuries it has been a canon of the common law that parents
speak for their minor children." 37
Psychiatric hospitalization provides a dramatic example of these ra-
tionales in practice, as well as illustrating their insufficiencies. In
Parham, the Supreme Court assessed the liberty interest of a minor
whose parents committed him to a state mental hospital.3 8 In an opin-
ion written by Chief Justice Burger, the majority recognized that psy-
chiatric commitments intrude upon constitutionally protected liberty
interests, but went on to hold that when parents commit a minor child
to a psychiatric hospital, the child is not entitled to a pre admission
hearing. 9 Instead, the Court held that such a child is entitled only to
post admission review by a "neutral and detached" party (a category
the Court deemed to include hospital employees) within thirty days
after admission-a hearing at which the child might lack
representation.4 °
In his concurrence, Justice Stewart clarified the Court's reasoning.
Justice Stewart stated that because parents speak for their children,
the children are in the position of patients who commit themselves
classes and then ran away from a residential treatment center to which his parents
"voluntarily" committed him as a foster placement).
33. America's Children At Risk, supra note 13, at 67 (noting that children under
18 comprised 41% of the population of private psychiatric hospitals in 1992 and that
50% of them did not receive appropriate treatment).
34. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting in dicta that the "pri-
mary role of parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition").
35. Courts often accept similar arguments where the state performs the guardian-
ship function instead of parents, even though it is patently clear that the impersonal
machinery of state bureucracy cannot demonstrate the personal concern of a loving
parent. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
36. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
37. Id. at 621 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, 1 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries *452-53).
38. Id. at 587.
39. Id. at 607.
40. See id.
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voluntarily, and that "voluntary" patients do not need procedural pro-
tections.4 ' In one quick stroke, Justice Stewart transformed the par-
ent into a ventriloquist, and the child into Charlie McCarthy; no
matter how the voices sound, they all come from the same place.
Both the majority opinion and Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Parham underestimated the" 'massive curtailment of liberty'" inher-
ent in institutionalization.4' The opinions also overlooked evidence in
the record that parents tend to institutionalize their children for rea-
sons unrelated to the child's mental condition.43 The dangers inherent
in "voluntary" psychiatric commitment of adolescents are well illus-
trated by R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic, P.C.4 In this case, seventeen-
year-old R.J.D.'s mother committed her to a private psychiatric hospi-
tal because the mother disapproved of R.J.D.'s relationship with a
man seven years her senior.45 R.J.D.'s objections to her hospitaliza-
tion landed her in a secure ward where she was denied access to tele-
phones.46 This situation occurred despite an earlier evaluation at a
different facility condficted during the same week which resulted in a
recommendation of "no medication and no follow-up," a finding en-
dorsed by a family court referee following yet another evaluation.47 A
guard informed the girl that she would stay in the hospital" 'as long as
someone was footing the bill.' "I
Perhaps the case of fifteen-year-old Sheila (a pseudonym) is more
typical if less theatrical. Sheila's divorced mother despaired of disci-
plining her after Sheila began experimenting with drugs, became sexu-
41. Id. at 622-23.
42. Id at 626 (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
43. See id. at 627-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the profound consequences
of erroneous commitment, the long periods of juvenile confinement, and the well doc-
umented inadequacies of children's psychiatric facilities).
44. 572 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 1990). In this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama
found that a mother had full authority to commit her daughter to a psychiatric facility
and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the daughter's action for false imprison-
ment and violation of her civil rights. Id- at 1229.
45. Id. at 1230 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. IL
47. Id. Although the family court in R.J.D. appointed a guardian ad litem for the
girl, she had no independent counsel, and the Vaughan clinic refused to allow her
guardian ad litem to communicate with her. I&. R.J.D. ultimately escaped from the
institution, aided by her father who had lost custody upon his divorce from R.ID.'s
mother some years earlier. Id. at 1226, 1230. If RJ.D.'s parents had functioned as one
unit and agreed about her treatment, independent counsel surely would have offered
her the only means of contesting her confinement. See id. at 1231.
State laws regarding procedural protections for minors admitted to public psychiat-
ric facilities vary widely. David Lambert, Growing Numbers of Youth Committed to
Psychiatric Hospitals, Youth L. News, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 12, 14. Admissions to pri-
vate hospitals covered by private insurance payments are not even governed by
Parham's requirement of minimal review procedures within 30 days after admission.
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 617 (1979) (limiting holding to admissions to state
mental hospitals).
48. R.J.D., 572 So. 2d at 1230 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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ally active, and dropped out of school.49 The mother sent Sheila to
live with her father." When Sheila arrived at the airport in the city
where her father lived, he refused to pick her up because he thought
her presence would upset his new family. 1 Sheila spent five weeks in
state detention and shelter facilities, after which her father committed
her to an adolescent treatment facility for a "conduct disorder."' Af-
ter exhausting Sheila's insurance coverage, the father agreed to pay
$50,000 a year to keep Sheila institutionalized until she turned eight-
een.53 The institution did not develop any rehabilitation plan for
Sheila. Its treatment of its residents, including the use of tiny isolation
cells, was virtually unregulated by the state. 4
Unfortunately, these stories are not anomalies. Although no pre-
cise statistics are available concerning adolescent psychiatric hospitali-
zation, experts estimate recent admissions of adolescents to private
psychiatric hospitals-free of even the token procedural precautions
imposed on public facilities under Parham-to be as high as between
150,000 and 250,000 each year.55 Indeed, children under the age of
eighteen comprise over forty percent of the patients in private psychi-
atric facilities.56 Many of these children, admitted as "voluntary" pa-
tients at their parents' request, exhibit behaviors that would not
normally lead to hospitalization of an adult, including "conduct disor-
ders" manifested by behavior such as "chronic violation of a variety of
important rules . . . at home ... or at school . . . [and] persistent
lying."'57 A substantial percentage of youngsters doubtless exhibit
these behaviors at some point during adolescence.
The above narratives suggest that the three key premises used to
negate children's claims to an independent voice require crucial quali-
fications.58 First, it is clear that the interests of parents and children
49. Lambert, supra note 47, at 13.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. Sheila's mother eventually gained her release.
55. Id. at 12 (citing Seattle, Washington Family Court Judge Terrence Carroll,
Presentation to the 17th Annual National Conference on Juvenile Justice (Mar. 24-26,
1990)); see also Lois A. Weithom, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An
Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 773, 783 (1988) (noting
that "[b]etween the 1920's and the 1970's admission rates of minors to mental hospi-
tals increased more than eight-fold").
56. America's Children At Risk, supra note 13, at 67 (citing Annie E. Casey Foun-
dation, A Mental Health Inititative for Urban Children (1992)). To be sure, many
young people, like numerous adults, require psychiatric hospitalization for treatment
of properly diagnosed disorders.
57. Lambert, supra note 47, at 12 n.3.
58. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text; see also Ira C. Lupu, The Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1317, 1320, 1373
(1994) (arguing for a "separation of powers" approach with more than one parental
figure or mediating institution making decisions about children in order to address the
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do not necessarily coincide. In the cases of Sheila and R.J.D., for ex-
ample, parents sought relief from the arduous job of raising and disci-
plining unruly adolescents. In abortion cases, parents may have many
reasons-including their own moral beliefs, position in the commu-
nity, and financial concerns-to urge a pregnant teenage girl either to
carry an infant to term or to abort.
A clear example of a situation in which parents cannot represent
their children's interests occurs when the parents are at odds with
each other. In bitterly contested custody disputes, for example, each
parent has an interest in the outcome of litigation that does not neatly
line up with the child's independent interest.5 9 Of course, the majority
of divorcing parents make their own joint choices about custody and
visitation, which are then entered in a judicial decree. 60 Relatively
few allow a stranger to make such a critical decision for them and
their children, but when they do defer to the court, many other factors
may be in play, including tradeoffs for financial consideration.
Although the child may in fact be the person with the greatest inter-
est at stake in a custody or visitation decision,6' the child's wishes may
not receive due consideration unless the child is represented by coun-
sel.62 The lawyers for the parents have no obligation to act in the
child's best interests; indeed, their duty to the parent may require
quite the opposite behavior. More is at stake than simply communi-
cating the child's preference. The child may require an attorney when
the court decides whether the child should testify or whether the con-
fidentiality of the child's communications with psychological counsel-
ors should be waived.63 As the highest court in Wisconsin urged in
reality that adult caretakers are "all fallible, imperfect, and self-regarding in their in-
teraction with children").
59. Joseph Goldstein, Albert J. Solnit, and Anna Freud oppose routine appoint-
ment of independent counsel for children in the custody context because such ap-
pointments undermine the relationship between parent and child by threatening the
normative assumption that parents speak for their children. They agree, however,
that the normative assumption is negated when, as in the circumstances discussed
here, the parents themselves cannot agree on a placement for the child, or the state
has intervened alleging abuse or neglect. Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best
Interests of the Child 111-12 (1979).
60. See Sanford N. Katz, The Judge and Child Custody Decision-making in the
United States, in Frontiers of Family Law 187, 188 (David Pearl & Res Pickford eds.,
1995).
61. Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 386 (Alaska 1977) ("[T]he child is the person
most interested in litigation over his custody.").
62. G.S. v. T.S., 23 Conn. App. 509, 518 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that in custody
proceedings neither parent can be relied on to communicate the child's interests
where those interests differ from his or her own (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193(1962))).
63. See, e.g., G.S., 23 Conn. App. at 517-18 (reversing custody decision in divorce
case for lower court's failure to appoint counsel for children where parents waived
child's privilege with sex abuse counselor and failed to call child as witness). The G.S.
court expressly noted that under state law, a parent who has an interest in the out-
come of a hearing cannot waive the confidential communication privilege on behalf of
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the divorce context, the child ought to be a player, not a football, in
the game of life.f'
Furthermore, even where the court believes that it recognizes divi-
sions between parents and child, the court may be misled regarding
the nature of those divisions if the child lacks counsel. Emancipation
proceedings initiated at the insistence of parents, rather than at the
child's initiative, provide an apt illustration. In such proceedings,
there is no adult to help the child define what is going on or to help
tell the judge the real story from the child's point of view.65
Second, parents may not be motivated by their children's needs and
interests. Most courts properly "assum[e] that the great majority of
parents are well motivated and act in what they reasonably perceive to
be the best interest of their children."66 Ideally, custodial parents
would always have their children's best interests at heart, would hear
and respond to their children's wishes and needs, and would work to-
gether with their children to make wise choices satisfying all con-
cerned. But parents, like state agencies and schools, do not always
live up to society's ideals-or to their own.67 In divorce custody situa-
tions, for example, children may be at the heart of parental conflict, so
that children become weapons used by feuding parents. Sheila and
R.J.D. each had at least one parent who wanted to abandon them in a
manner that would not attract social opprobrium. Some parents are
simply too emotionally deprived themselves to love their children gen-
erously. Justice Brennan's analysis of the facts in Parham led him to
conclude that it "ignores reality to assume blindly that [all] parents act
in their children's best interests when making commitment decisions
and when waiving their children's due process rights." 68An unvar-
nished view of reality, Justice Brennan reasoned, suggests that "a child
a minor. Id. at 517-18 & n.7 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146k(d)); see also Brief of
Appellee Minor Children Carisa, Nicholas and Dylan Miller at 19-23, Miller v. Miller,
No. PEN-95-97 (Sup. Ct. Me. May 14, 1995) (arguing that children in divorce custody
litigation are entitled to a lawyer to represent their views when the court-appointed
guardian ad litem takes a position in conflict with theirs).
64. Weichman v. Weichman, 184 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Wis. 1971).
65. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Chil-
dren in Modem Times, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 239, 277-283 (1992) (reporting data that
parents commonly initiate the idea of emancipation, urge the minor to seek it, and
even initiate and dominate filing of the petition).
66. In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1295 (Cal. 1977). In this case, the court held that
children are entitled to due process protections to prevent erroneous psychiatric hos-
pitalizations. Id at 1289.
67. Id. at 1295 (reasoning that fact of normative parental condem "cannot, how-
ever, detract in any way from the child's right to procedures that will protect him from
arbitrary curtailment of his liberty interest.., no matter how well motivated").
68. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 632 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Although Justice Brennan acknowledged that a pre committment
hearing is generally required, he conceded that because of the special circumstances
governing assumptions about familial relations, a post commitment hearing would
suffice in cases of involuntary committment of children by their parents. Id. at 632-33.
[Vol. 641584
1996] APPOINTING COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION
who has been ousted from his family has even greater need for an
independent advocate."69
Third, parents and state guardians do not and cannot always speak
for their children, even if, they are well-motivated and believe that
their interests coincide with the child's. For example, parents them-
selves may not hear or understand their children. Families may be-
lieve they communicate well, but fail to do so, or may be aware that
communication has broken down. As Justice Marshall observed in the
context of abortion, controversies between children and parents only
reach the court "where the minor and the... parent[s] are... funda-
mentally in conflict and the very existence of the [dispute] already has
fractured the family structure. '70
Even where parents agree with each other and the united parental
interest aligns with the child's independent interest, parents may not
speak adequately enough to protect a child's interests. For this rea-
son, federal courts have uniformly held that non lawyer parents ap-
pearing pro se may not represent their children in court.71 Parents
cannot waive their children's right to counsel in civil litigation because
"'[t]he right to counsel belongs to the children .... "72
In still other instances, parents cannot represent a child's interests
because the legal issue before a court involves a dispute directly be-
tween the child and the state, and the state is the child's custodian.
Examples of this situation include the following: treatment of unac-
companied, undocumented immigrant children;73 children who wish to
69. kL at 631 (summarizing such circumstances as "break[s] in family autonomy").
70. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (discussing judicial
bypass proceedings to authorize abortion over the objections of teenager's parents);
see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 635 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that prompt
postadmission commitment hearings would not disrupt the family because "the inter-
est in avoiding family discord would be less significant at this stage since the family
autonomy already will have been fractured by the [psychiatric] institutionalization of
the child").
71. See, e.g., Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (appointing counsel for child whose nonlawyer father appeared on her be-
half and noting that three circuit courts had expressly held that a parent cannot pro-
ceed without a licensed attorney when representing a minor child's interests); infra
notes 160-69 and accompanying text (noting that courts do not permit nonlawyer par-
ents to represent their children).
72. Brown, 868 F. Supp. at 171 (quoting Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of Pa.,
937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991)). Ironically, parents may waive their children's right
to counsel and even appear for their children in delinquency proceedings, in which
children have a constitutional right to representation. See Huff v. K.P., 302 N.W.2d
779, 783 (N.D. 1981) (finding that father of 11-year-old may waive child's right to
counsel and appear for her "albeit rather ineffectively").
73. See Perez-Funez v. District Director, INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 659, 670 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (holding that unaccompanied minors detained by the INS and facing deporta-
tion have no right to appointed counsel, but should be able to contact an adult before
waiving their right to seek relief from deportation); see also Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct.
1439, 1448 (1993) (finding that state has right to retain custody of unaccompanied
minor where no parent or legal guardian can be found).
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contest conditions of confinement in a facility run by a governmental
entity;74 and children in foster care.'
Intriguingly, courts themselves, in the cases cited most frequently in
support of the principle of coincidence of interests between parents
and children, go on to invalidate that very principle by upholding
state-imposed restrictions on the parents' unbridled control of their
children. After bowing to the principle of parental autonomy, the
Supreme Court has held, for example, that states may require parents
to have their children vaccinated, 76 forbid parents to allow children
under a certain age to work,77 and terminate parental rights altogether
if parents fail to meet the state's minimal standards of adequacy.78
Courts have constrained parental rights to control their children in
order to impose the state's vision of the child's best interests, but
rarely to assure realization of the minor's autonomous vision.79
Notwithstanding clear holdings to the contrary, courts routinely con-
tinue to articulate the canon that parents always represent their chil-
dren. The foundation cases reveal that the ideal of parental control
does not erect an impermeable shield against competing claims.
74. See, e.g., Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 789-90 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding
that state-run juvenile facility did not have to provide resident children with law li-
brary or legal assistance).
75. The facts in Parham capture the problem. Several of the plaintiffs in Parham
were committed to the state hospital by the state's child welfare agency, including the
lead plaintiff, J.R. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 587 & n.2 (1979). A court declared
J.R. a neglected child when he was three months old and J.R. had moved in to and out
of seven different foster homes by age seven when he entered the state hospital. Id. at
590. The authorities believed that J.R., whom they diagnosed as "borderline retarded,
.. would 'benefit from [a] structured environment' ... and would 'enjoy living and
playing with boys of the same age' at the hospital. Id. Although it is difficult to
imagine a parent seeking to institutionalize a child as a way of structuring a play
group, the majority denied that the state would "act[] so differently from a natural
parent in seeking medical assistance for the child." Id. at 618. The court conceded,
however, that a child in the state's custody might ultimately be " 'lost in the shuffle'"
and overstay his need for hospitalization. Id. at 619.
Mishandling and neglect of children in the custody of a state agency is not unusual.
Indeed, the child welfare systems in 21 states are currently under court order or con-
sent decrees for failure to protect children or to provide needed services to their fami-
lies. Abusing the Nation's Children, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1996, at A30.
76. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-38 (1905).
77. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
78. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1982).
79. Cases frequently cited as establishing children's independent rights under the
Constitution often involve no conflict between parents and children, but rather are
examples of parents promoting their children's exercise of rights consistent with their
own political or religious views. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504, 514 (1969) (upholding children's right to nondisruptive
speech in school that coincided with their parents' religious views and political
activism).
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B. Children Remain Voiceless
The children at the heart of some of the foundation cases defining
the relationships among parents, children, and the state were voice-
less. The trial court in Prince v. Massachusettss0 heard testimony that
nine-year-old Betty Simmons believed herself to be an ordained min-
ister in the Jehovah's Witness faith and that her failure to distribute
religious literature "would bring condemnation 'to everlasting de-
struction at Armageddon.' "81 Yet, the Supreme Court belittled
Betty's own convictions and instead considered her a martyr to the
beliefs of her guardian. 2 No one even asked Amish youngsters
Vernon Yutzy and Barbara Miller-whose parents were named par-
ties in Wisconsin v. Yoder" 3-whether they wished to receive a secular
education. Justice Douglas emphasized in his dissent from the major-
ity's holding in Yoder that Amish parents could justify withdrawing
their children from public school after the eighth grade in order to
preserve their religious community without running afoul of compul-
sory education laws.84 Justice Douglas emphasized that courts should
not "assume an identity of interest between parent and child," but
instead "children should be entitled to be heard" regarding their own
beliefs and desires.85 Justice Douglas admonished that:
While the parents, absent dissent, normally speak for the entire
family, the education of the child is a matter on which the child will
often have decided views. He may want to be a pianist or an astro-
naut or an oceanographer. To do so he will have to break from the
Amish tradition.s6 -
Justice Douglas emphasized that "[i]t is the future of the student, not
the future of the parents" that is at stake in deciding whether or not to
enforce compulsory education laws.87
80. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
81. IL at 163.
82. See id at 170. Justice Jackson's dissent in Prince gave Betty's personal reli-
gious freedoms greater weight. I& at 178 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court now
draws a line based on age that cuts across both true exercise of religion and auxiliary
secular activities.").
83. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
84. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Douglas joined in the majority opinion-which exempted Amish children from com-
pulsory attendance in high school on religious grounds-insofar as it concerned
Frieda Yoder who testified concerning her own religious beliefs. Id. at 243. Frieda
Yoder, Justice Douglas emphasized, did not speak for the other children whose fu-
tures were at issue because "[r]eligion is an individual experience." Id.
85. Id at 242, 244.
86. Id. at 244-45. The majority strenuously insisted that the case did not present
any issue involving a tension between the religious interests asserted by the parents
and differing views asserted by children. Id. at 230-31 (concluding that only the par-
ents are subject to penalty under the statute at issue and it is "their right of free
exercise, not that of their children, that must determine" the outcome).
87. Id. at 245.
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Judicial deference to parents, and what is viewed as the proper re-
sponse to children's vulnerabilities promoted by such deference, un-
justifiably deprives children of their own voice in the courtroom.
When judges fail to recognize that children may be vulnerable with
respect to their parents as well as to adult third parties, they adopt an
unrealistically truncated view of children's need and right to be heard.
The situations in which children may need independent counsel in
civil litigation share a number of characteristics: (1) the state is al-
ready involved in the dispute, either as a primary party or because a
genuine disagreement is before a court;88 (2) a potential conflict of
interest between the parents and the child exists or an actual conflict
has been found, or the state has legal or physical custody of the child,
all resulting in destruction of the presumption that an adult partici-
pant represents the child's interest; and (3) the child's interests in the
outcome of the litigation are substantial, perhaps even implicating es-
sential liberty interests.89
II. "ViariM[s] FIRST OF FEAR, THEN OF PANIC":' CHILDREN'S
VULNERABILITIES AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF THE
COURTS
The developmental distinctions between the average adult and the
average child are generally taken for granted-with or without justifi-
cation.9' These distinctions-including differences in cognition, emo-
tion, and judgment-as well as changing perceptions of them raise
threshold questions concerning the relationship between the compe-
88. The author omits uncontested family matters that require judicial decrees such
as uncontested divorce, visitation or custody arrangements, uncontested paternity or
child support issues, and uncontested adoptions or surrogacy proceedings. Nonethe-
less, if, for example, the parents both agree to a visitation order to which the child
objects, and the parents ask the court to enforce the order, the child should be repre-
sented. See Brian Cummings, Appeals Court Blocks Judge's Sanctions Against 12-year-
old Who Won't Visit Dad, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 3, 1995, at 3 (holding in contempt
and incarcerating 12-year-old girl because she and her younger sister refused to com-
ply with visitation order).
89. The legal definition of liberty is of course narrower than Henry Ward
Beecher's definition of the concept as encompassing "the soul's right to breathe."
Henry Ward Beecher, Life Thoughts, Gathered From the Extemporaneous Dis-
courses of Henry Ward Beecher 70 (1858). On the other hand, its contours in law
"have not been defined precisely." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). Lib-
erty has been deemed to include, among other things, the right to enjoy the privileges
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," encompassing freedom
from unjustified intrusions on "personal security." IL (citations bmitted).
90. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1947).
91. Melton argues that courts have largely ignored the developmental literature
on children's competency. Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A
Problem in Law and Social Science, in Children's Competence to Consent 1, 14 (Gary
B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); see also Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma:
Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1873, 1905 (1996) (argu-
ing that judges hearing cases involving children should "be aware of scientific re-
search concerning children's development, and rely on [it] appropriately").
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tency of the child, including various capabilities or capacities, and the
appointment of counsel. 2 Other authors in this Conference address
some of the thorny issues surrounding how to determine whether chil-
dren are competent to direct the course of litigation, and how differing
levels of competence affect the weight that courts should give to chil-
dren's preferences concerning the outcome of litigation.93 The argu-
ment in this Article is confined to children of a certain age (i.e., at
least possessing verbal means of communication and the ability to for-
mulate and communicate a preference to an attorney) who are
deemed to possess the requisite capacity.94
92. Capacity may not be the best term due to its legal connotation. Perhaps the
better formulation is whether the child can arrive at a position and communicate it to
counsel.
93. For a discussion of how attorneys should go about determining whether the
child has the requisite capacity to direct the representation, and for standards on rep-
resenting the child who lacks such capacity, see generally Martin Guggenheim, A Par-
adigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399
(1996) (proposing a paradigm for ascertaining counsel's role for young children and
applying the paradigm to criminal and deliquency proceedings, custody and visitation
proceedings, and child protective proceedings); Peter Margulies, Children's Compe-
tence in Context: Confronting Lawyers' Ethical Dilemmas, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1473
(1996) (addressing how lawyers representing children should define competence and
what a lawyer's role should be in representing a child who appears incompetent);
Mlyniec, supra note 91 (exploring how judge's hearing cases involving children can
benefit from child development research); Recommendations of the Conference, supra
note 21, parts IV, V (discussing the representation of pre verbal and impaired chil-
dren). Although this Article does not attempt to define the capacity required to di-
rect counsel in any or all of the situations discussed here, it is worth noting that at
least one Supreme Court Justice concluded after reviewing the developmental litera-
ture that the "moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of
the adult," echoing submissions by the American Psychological Association. Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Piaget,
Elkind, Kohlberg, Gesell and other experts in child development, psychology, and
sociology). Justice Douglas apparently would have placed the burden on the party
opposing the child's preference to demonstrate that the child.lacked capacity. See id.
("[T]here is nothing in this record to indicate that the moral and intellectual judgment
demanded of the student by the question in this case is beyond his capacity."); see also
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Appellees
at 15, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1988) (No. 85-673) ("[I]t is now generally
accepted that by mid-adolescence (14-15) the great majority of [children] do not differ
from adults in their capacities to understand and [make decisions] about medical and
psychological treatment altnernatives .... ."); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psy-
chological Association in Support of Appellees at 25, Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495) (arguing that
a substantial and growing body of literature supports the view that children between
11 and 14 years of age have the capacity to weigh risks and benefits in decision mak-
ing and that by age 14 most minors do not differ from adults in their ability to under-
stand alternatives and make decisions of the same quality as those made by adults).
For a comprehensive analysis of the debate in the current literature regarding law and
child development, see Mlyniec, supra note 91, at 1875-85.
94. Of course, questions concerning the relationship between capacity and the
ability to understand the counsel offered by an attorney and in turn to instruct an
attorney are not limited to minors. See generally Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawy-
ering and De Facto Guardians, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1429 (1994) (addressing the rela-
tionship between old age and the ability to direct representation).
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A. Vulnerabilities Inherent in the Status of Childhood
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the peculiar vulnerabili-
ties of children and has held these vulnerabilities to have legal signifi-
cance affecting both children's liberty interests and their need for
counsel. This part explores the portrait of minors as a group that
emerges from Supreme Court decisions in order to ascertain the legal
vision of the essential characteristics of childhood within the legal sys-
tem. The status of childhood is-at least in part-socially constructed
by law. Such legal construction, in turn, is to some extent grounded in
and reflects contemporary perceptions of the characteristics common
to many members of the group whose status is being defined.95 As
depicted by the Supreme Court, children's vulnerabilities may take
two forms-vulnerabilities intrinsic to the state of being a child, and
those that result from the child's contextual powerlessness. The por-
trait that emerges is dominated by the almost tautological attribute of
"immaturity." The child is seen as an unwary "victim," lacking in ex-
perience, intelligence, and education, and having limited capacity to
understand rights and the consequences of waiving rights.
The Supreme Court has differentiated between the rights of "ma-
ture" and "immature" minors, but has not provided guidance on how
lower courts should measure or ascertain maturity.96 Moreover, the
Court has never unbundled the vulnerabilities that characterize "im-
maturity." The very concept of measurement may be misleading be-
cause children's vulnerability should not be conceptualized as a single
point on a spectrum. Rather, vulnerability is a bundle of presumed,
perceived, or measurable ways in which children differ from adults in
dimensions such as factual understanding, inferential understanding
(appreciation), reasoning (both intellectual and moral), and ability to
exercise choice, including understanding the repercussions of choice.97
Martha Minow warns that while it may be attractive to propose an
analytical framework for assessing when children develop different
kinds of competencies requiring different sorts of protection or privi-
lege, "the contemporary legal universe" rests on no such rational
95. It is not the goal of this Article to compare the view of children's vuinerabili-
ties within the law to any external reality of childhood as captured by social science or
other data.
96. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-43 (1979) (distinguishing abortion rights of
mature and immature minors); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning bright line between 15- and 16-year-olds
for purposes of establishing a level of maturity sufficient to establish the culpability
necessary to meet death penalty requirements). This important question also lies be-
yond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the failure of judges to take ac-
count of social science literature in assessing children's capacity, see Mlyniec, supra
note 91, at 13-33.
97. Unbundling these assorted distinctions between adults and children, referred
to collectively as "vulnerabilities," or analyzing how each one relates to the exercise
of legal rights or decision making, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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scheme.98 The same minor who is potentially subject to the death
penalty, she points out, may not be able to marry without a parent's
consent.99 "It is bizarre," Minow summarizes:
to justify the variable treatment of young people currently mani-
fested in the patchwork of legal regulations as though it expressed
careful judgments about their competencies for various tasks and
responsibilities. Why would a sixteen-year-old be competent to
consent to her own abortion but not to miss school for her doctor's
appointment without her parents permission?' 00
The Supreme Court has struggled for over fifty years with the issue
of the relationship between children's presumed level of competency
and their relative need for counsel. One of the earliest examples of
the Supreme Court weighing youth as a special factor occurred in the
appeal of the "Scottsboro boys" whom the Court held needed counsel
in their 1932 capital trial (predating recognition of the right to counsel
in all criminal cases).' The opinion emphasized "the ignorance and
illiteracy of the defendants, their youth," and the fact that communica-
tion with their families was "necessarily difficult" because of geo-
graphical distance.'02
As early as 1947, the Court concluded that adolescents, even more
than adults, need counsel in order to negotiate the criminal justice
system.'0 3 The observations and analysis that gave rise to this conclu-
sion apply equally to many aspects of the civil justice system.
In Haley v. Ohio, °4 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated
that a fifteen-year-old boy, "a mere child-an easy victim of the law,"
could not withstand intense police interrogation as well as "a mature
man." '0 5 Reaching beyond the narrow facts, Justice Douglas ex-
plained that "[a]ge 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy.... He
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That
98. Minow, supra note 7, at 285.
99. L at 284.
100. Id at 285.
101. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S 45, 71 (1932).
102. Id- at 71 (emphasis added). In the case of the children whose rights are consid-
ered here, communication with their families may be "necessarily difficult" because
of emotional, rather than geographic, distance.
103. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,
599-600 (1947); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1972) (including
deliquency proceedings in instances requiring appointment of counsel even in the ab-
sence of a felony accusation). Haley and Gallegos preceded the Court's decisions in
both In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (holding that children in juvenile court facing
possible incarceration have a right to counsel) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
473 (1966) (holding that adults have the right to remain silent or request an attorney
during custodial interrogation). It is unclear to what extent Miranda rights extend to
minors in juvenile proceedings. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4 (1979).
104. 332 U.S. 596 (1947).
105. Id- at 599. Haley reversed a conviction based on a confession obtained during
five hours of questioning in the middle of the night conducted without presence of the
boy's lawyer or mother. The reversal was based in part on the boy's age. See id.
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which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instabil-
ity which the crisis of adolescence produces. '10 6 A child without
counsel or friend is likely, Justice Douglas stated, "to become the vic-
tim first of fear, then of panic."'" 7 Therefore, a fifteen-year-old child
needs counsel in order to "have a full appreciation" of his rights.'08
In Gallegos v. Colorado,10 9 the Court clarified that "[t]he youth of
the suspect was the crucial factor in Haley.""0 Reversing a conviction
based on the confession of a fourteen-year-old boy who was not al-
lowed to see either an attorney or his mother during police interroga-
tion, the Court explained that even a "sophisticated" fourteen-year-
old
is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the
benefits of his constitutional rights ....
... He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his
senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admis-
sions.... Without some adult protection ... a 14-year-old boy
would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional
rights as he had.1"
The Supreme Court has expressly identified "the ,peculiar vulnera-
bility of children" and "their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner" as two of three reasons that justify distin-
guishing the constitutional rights of children from those of adults."
2
According to this analysis, children's vulnerability, which creates spe-
cial "needs for 'concern,... sympathy, and ... paternal attention'"
may justify diminished constitutional guarantees, such as denying chil-
dren the right to a jury trial in delinquency adjudications." 3 Similarly,
the Supreme Court has concluded that children lack the attributes
necessary for making sound decisions because "[i]nexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the [child] less able to evaluate
the consequences of his or her conduct."" 4  The Court has described
106. Id. at 599.
107. Id. at 600.
108. Id. at 601.
109. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
110. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 54. To be sure, in both Haley and Gallegos, Justice Douglas collapsed
several categories of adult advisors and did not clearly distinguish between parent,
friend, and attorney. The failure to focus specifically on the right to an attorney is
attributable, at least in large part, to the date of the opinions, which precede establish-
ment of the right to counsel for adults in similar circumstances. See Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
112. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). The third reason is the importance
attributed to the "parental role in child rearing." Id.
113. Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (plu-
rality opinion)).
114. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988); see also Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he simple truth derived
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minors as lacking "the experience, perspective, and judgment to rec-
ognize and avoid choices" that could prove detrimental. 115
Similarly, when the Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C." 6 pro-
vided guidance to lower courts on applying the "totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances" approach to waivers by juveniles in delinquency
proceedings, it mandated "evaluation of the juvenile's age, experi-
ence, education, ... and intelligence, and into whether he has the
capacity to understand" the law and the consequences of waiving legal
rights." 7 Of course, such factors leave much room for disagreement.
For example, in Fare the Court held that a murder confession made in
the course of a robbery by a sixteen-year-old boy who had been on
probation since age twelve was admissible even though the police had
denied the boy's request to see his probation officer."18 Dissenters
emphasized the boy's vulnerability; a tape revealed that he was crying
during interrogation, had the "limited understanding of the average
16-year-old," and experienced "'extensive' family problems." 19 The
dissenters agreed with the testimony of the boy's probation officer
that "many times the kids don't understand what is going on."'' 0
Criminal charges are hardly the only contact with mechanisms of
the state and the courts that are likely to seem menacing to a young
person.' 2 ' Involvement with courts for any purpose may intimidate
the experienced as well as the novitiate, thereby discouraging or com-
plicating effective communication with state actors such as child pro-
tection workers, foster care agency personnel, and school officials, as
well as with the judge.
from communal experience that juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation
and responsibility that we presume in adults. .. ").
115. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. State courts have relied on the Bellotti factors in
upholding abridgements of liberty for minors, such as nocturnal curfews. See, e.g.,
People in Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) (using Bellotti factors to
determine that juvenile curfew did not infringe on minor's liberty interest in freedom
of movement); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 368 (Iowa 1989) (apply-
ing Bellotti factors to determine that minors' liberty interests in nocturnal movement
are not co-extensive with the rights of adults).
116. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
117. 1& at 725 (holding that there was no violation of rights where minor asked to
see a probation officer rather than an attorney, but recognizing that the fact of youth
and its attendant attributes should be weighed).
118. Id. at 728.
119. Id at 733 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. Id (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 729 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that "heightened concern" is appropriate where juveniles are under investigation).
Melton points out that the Supreme Court decided Fare and Parham on the same day
and yet took irreconcilable views of children's competency in the two cases. Melton,
supra note 91, at 5-6.
121. Officials representing institutions such as schools, foster care, welfare, or hous-.
ing authorities all wield enormous authority over children and their families.
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B. Contextual Vulnerabilities that Inhibit Children's Voice
The efforts of minors to stand up for their rights expose their con-
textual vulnerability as well as the vulnerabilities deemed inherent to
the young psyche. Although the courts have expressed concern about
peer influence over the young, minors are at least as vulnerable to
parental pressure. Parents may place onerous burdens on children
who try to assert independent rights in a litigation context.
Parents have impressive means of imposing their- views on adoles-
cents, as disagreements over abortion illustrate. 2 ' Justice Blackmun,
for example, astutely pointed out that a "minor's emotional vulnera-
bility and financial dependency on her parents" make a parental no-
tice statute "tantamount to a parental-consent statute.'12 3  The
reported cases establish that "[m]any minor women will encounter in-
terference from their parents after the state-imposed notification. In
addition to parental disappointment and disapproval, the minor may
confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support,
or actual obstruction of the abortion decision. "124 Statutes that im-
pose virtually insurmountable barriers to a teenager's ability to make
her own decision about abortion are particularly inappropriate when
imposed on those girls who are most likely to rely on judicial bypass
procedures, that is, girls unfortunate enough not to be part of compas-
sionate, supportive, communicating families."z As Justice Marshall
noted:
[C]ompelled notification is unlikely to result in productive consulta-
tion in families in which a daughter does not feel comfortable con-
sulting her parents about intimate or sexual matters.... Forced
notification in such situations would amount to punishing the
daughter for the lack of a stable and communicative family environ-
ment, when the blame for that situation lies principally, if not en-
tirely, with the parents. 2 6
122. This Article relies heavily on the cases involving minors' abortion rights be-
cause this issue has been so thoroughly litigated, the interests are so stark, and the
doctrines have been so thoroughly aired by the courts; this reliance is not intended to
indicate the frequency with which the issue arises or the importance of such cases in
the author's own hierarchy of the rights of minors.
123. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 526 (1990) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
124. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438-39, 438 & n.24 (1981) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (citing records that demonstrate parental interference).
125. See Akron Center, 497 U.S. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 469-70 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted); see also Matheson, 450 U.S. at 437-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing the burden that compelled notification places on minors living in "non-
ideal" situations); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,75 (1976) (discussing
the effects of forced notitifcation on the family unit); American Academy of Pediat-
rics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 560, 561-62 app. (Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that
a girl's decision not to involve her parents in her decision to seek an abortion "does
not lead to a poor familial relationship, but is the result of a poor familial relation-
[Vol. 641594
1996] APPOINTING COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION 1595
A girl from this "less-than-ideal family" 127 needs a counselor to guide
her through state procedures in which she must justify her desire to
make her own decision without the influence of her parents.
The vulnerabilities of children have long been used to justify depriv-
ing them of liberty.128 And yet, the Court has never unbundled the
specific vulnerabilities of children or addressed the precise legal im-
portance of each of those vulnerabilities. Taken as a whole, however,
the bundle of vulnerabilities bears directly and affirmatively on chil-
dren's need for appointed counsel.
III. APPLYING THE FACTORS GOVERNING JUDICIAL DISCRETION
TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR PRO SE INDIGENTS
The federal courts have largely agreed upon guidelines governing
the exercise of the judicial discretion to appoint counsel for unrepre-
sented, indigent persons in pending litigation.2 9 Cases interpreting
the parameters of the leeway accorded federal judges to appoint coun-
sel for indigents are equally useful to, though not binding on, courts
hearing civil matters involving minors.
A. The Factors that Guide the Discretion of Federal Courts Support
Appointing Counsel for the Especially Vulnerable
The federal statute governing special procedures for indigent plain-
tiffs, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), provides that an indigent party may proceed
in forma pauperis, and that "the court may request an attorney to rep-
resent any.., person unable to employ counsel.' 130 Congress enacted
§ 1915 in 1892, apparently to "codify existing fights or powers.''
Congress was aware when it enacted the precursor to the current stat-
ute that at least twelve states had adopted statutes expressly "permit-
ship" and that the delay which results from imposing a statutory consent requirement
is detrimental to the girl's health (emphasis omitted)).
127. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. See Melton, supra note 91, at 5-6 (observing the ironic results in Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), and Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), decided on the
same day, and noting that in Parham incompetence meant no pre commitment hear-
ing was necessary, but in Fare the child was deemed competent to waive rights in a
criminal setting).
129. The origin of judicial discretion to appoint counsel for the indigent lies both in
the common law and in statutes. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296,
312-13 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he lawyer's duty to provide
professional assistance to the poor is part of the ancient traditions of the bar long
recognized," and that a court's power to order such service "is firmly rooted in the
authority to define the terms and conditions upon which members are admitted to the
bar"); see also Esther L. Brown, Lawyers and the Promotion of Justice 253-54 (1938)
("[I]t has long been customary for the court to assign counsel to those who cannot
furnish their own attorney."); Reginald H. Smith, Justice and the Poor 100 (reprint
1971) (1967) (noting that courts possess "inherent power ... to assign attorneys").
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
131. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 307.
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ting courts to assign counsel to represent indigent litigants" in civil
matters. 132
There is substantial agreement among the federal circuits regarding
a nonexhaustive list of factors for trial courts to consider in exercising
their discretion to appoint counsel under § 1915.133 As a threshold
matter, a judge must determine that the applicant lacks the financial
resources to retain counsel. 34 We may assume that, except for the
rare child who not only possesses a trust fund but controls access to its
resources, virtually all children will cross this first hurdle.135
Assuming indigence, many jurisdictions instruct judges to turn next
to the probability that a plaintiff's case is "likely to be of sub-
stance."'1 36 The rationale for this factor is, of course, that free lawyers
are a scarce commodity. 37 Notwithstanding the homily that courts
should be as readily available to the poor as to the rich, this lofty
principle has never actualized. 138 In certain types of litigation, contin-
gency fees provide a means for the merits of certain claims to deter-
mine availability of counsel.139 But where "only" rights are involved
(in contrast to a potentially large monetary award), some form of
triage is necessary before attorneys dedicate their energies to a
case.' 40 Where no hope of compensation is held out, "[a] claim that
132. Id. at 302. Justice Brennan noted that few appointments appear to have been
made under those statutes or under the state court's common law powers, as such
powers were exercised in Great Britain from the 15th through late 19th centuries. IL
at 303-04.
133. See, e.g., Rucks v. Boergermarn, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing cases
interpreting § 1915(d) from the Third and Seventh Circuits); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147; 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing cases from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1306 (1994); Lavado v.
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing cases from the First, Fifth, Sev-
enth, and D.C. Circuits); Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing cases
from the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); cf. Castner v. Colorado Springs
Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1420-23 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing appointment of coun-
sel in Title VII employment discrimination cases under the similar provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(f)(1) (1988) and citing cases from the First, Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
134. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157 n.5; Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d
1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994).
135. A minor who has access to a trust fund might be in a position to request the
court to order the trustees to pay reasonable attorney's fees. The average child liti-
gant would presumably be indigent in the sense of lacking funds to retain counsel
even if his or her parents had significant resources. Nothing would prevent a judge
from ordering such parents to pay the counsel appointed by the court.
136. See, e.g., Cooper v. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting
request for appointment of appellate counsel following jury trial at which petitioner
was represented because the underlying employment discrimination claim lacked
merit, and clarifying the criteria that courts should use in determining whether to
appoint counsel).
137. See id. at 172-73. This proposition has been cited with approval in other Cir-
cuits. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 157; Castner, 979 F.2d at 1421.
138. Cooper, 877 F.2d at 173.
139. IL
140. Id. at 172.
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could not command a lawyer's acceptance if possessed by an em-
ployed middle-class property owner should not command a pro bono
lawyer.' 141
To be sure, it may be difficult for a pro se litigant of any age to
present even the initial outlines of a legal claim without counsel in
order to survive these preliminary inquiries, but judges are regularly
called upon to make such determinations. 142 Appellate courts have
clearly stated that in this context, the trial court is not to guess at the
ultimate result, but should eliminate claims that are frivolous, even if
they could survive a motion to dismiss.143 Because the same disabili-
ties that may warrant appointment of counsel-particularly the diffi-
culty of translating a perceived injustice into a legal claim and
marshaling facts and legal arguments to support that claim-afflict the
applicant at this preliminary stage, the standard that courts use to as-
sess the claim must be generous and tend toward leniency and
inclusiveness.'"
As an additional threshold matter, applicants must establish that
they have diligently attempted to secure counsel.145 Adults may sat-
isfy this criterion by contacting lawyers.' 46 Minors could certainly be
asked to do the same, but such a requirement is likely to result in
mere formalities. The diligence required to overcome the obstacles to
initiating a claim in the case of a child petitioner should suffice to
establish the requisite good faith and the equivalent of a zealous quest
for assistance in pursuing the matter. As the Supreme Court of Cali-
141. Id. at 173.
142. See Sawma v. Perales, 895 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1990) (Motley, J., dissenting)
(finding that trial court should have appointed counsel for appellant who submitted
prolix, incomprehensible, unartful. brief).
143. Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Even where the claim is
not frivolous, counsel is often unwarranted where the indigent's chances of success
are extremely slim." (citation omitted)).
144. Cooper v. Sargenti, 877 F.2d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he preliminary as-
sessment of likely merit must be undertaken somewhat more generously since the
unrepresented litigant might have difficulty articulating the circumstances that will
indicate the merit that might be developed by competent counsel.").
145. See Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that § 1915
dictates that litigant be unable to obtain counsel); Jackson v. County of McLean, 53
F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that § 1915 requires that indigent make an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain counsel before court appoints counsel).
146. See Jenkins v. Chemical Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that in
the analytically related area of employment discrimination suits, see supra note 133, a
"reasonably diligent effort" to obtain counsel is measured by such considerations as
the availability of counsel in the locality, plaintiff's skill in seeking help, and the
number of actual contacts with potential counsel (citing Bradshaw v. Zoological
Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981))); see also Poindexter v. FBI, 737 F.2d 1173,
1182 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs seeking appointment of counsel in
discrimination suits have a lesser burden than those seeking such appointment in
§ 1915 cases).
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fornia has observed, "it is fatuous to assume that a minor in custody
will be in a position to call an attorney for assistance." 147
The next and most critical step of the courts' inquiry is analysis of a
cluster of factors designed to assess the applicant's ability to present
his or her case pro se. These factors include "the indigent's ability to
investigate the crucial facts, whether the conflicting evidence implicat-
ing the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented
to the fact finder, the indigent's ability to present the case, [and] the
complexity of the legal issues. ' 148 A court should also consider any
special factors suggesting that appointment of counsel would "more
likely lead to a just determination.' ' 49
In Tabron v. Grace,50 for example, the Third Circuit remanded for
reconsideration the denial of counsel for a prisoner because-the case
involved complex discovery and issues of credibility. 15  The decision
in Tabron supported appointment of counsel even though the legal
issues of the case were not complex, the applicable law was clear, and
the plaintiff appeared literate and reasonably capable.' 52 The court
147. People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793, 797 (Cal. 1971) (holding that when a minor in
police custody asks to see his parents, he triggers his rights under Miranda to termi-
nate the interrogation).
All of the circuits that have addressed the question agree that the plaintiff's ability
to afford counsel, the merits of the case, and the complexity of the case are important
factors. See Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 978-79 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995); Edgington v.
Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir, 1995); Tabron v. Grace, 6
F.3d 147, 153, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1306 (1994); Lavado v.
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1993); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15,
23-24 (1st Cir. 1991); Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989); Hodge, 802 F.2d
at 60-62; Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984); Ulmer v. Chancellor,
691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982); Maclin, 650 F.2d at 887-89; cf. Poindexter, 737 F.2d
at 1182 n.18, 1185, 1189 (comparing appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) to appointment under § 1915(d)).
148. Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61-62.
149. Id. at 62; see also Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1994) (finding that litigant was not prejudiced by proceeding pro se at trial after
district court refused to appoint counsel for him because codefendant was represented
by counsel throughout proceedings), At least ten circuits agree that the plaintiff's
ability to proceed pro se should also be examined. See Rucks, 57 F.3d at 979;
$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d at 569; Edgington, 52 F.3d at 780; Tabron, 6 F.3d
at 156; Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606; DeRosiers, 949 F. 2d at 24; Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61-62;
Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 163; Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213; Maclin, 650 F.2d at 888. Only the
Eleventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have not expressly held that a plaintiff's ability
to represent himself or herself should be considered in deciding whether or not to
appoint counsel. In Holt, however, the Eleventh Circuit implied that its list of factors
was not exhaustive, citing cases that included the plaintiff's ability to proceed pro se.
862 F.2d at 853 (stating that "the district court typically considers, among other fac-
tors," the merits of the case (emphasis added)). The D.C. Circuit has considered the
plaintiff's ability to proceed pro se in Title VII cases, and has held that Title VII
imposes a lower standard on the plaintiff and does not require indigency. See
Poindexter, 737 F.2d at 1182 n.18, 1184-85.
150. 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993).
151. Id. at 156.
152. Id at 158.
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explained that assessments of the plaintiff's ability to present the case
should also involve consideration of the plaintiff's educational level,
literacy, work experience, and prior experience with litigation.153
Even gifted children whose educational level exceeds their age would
be unlikely to have experience in the workplace or in civil litigation
that would prepare them to present their own cases.154 For instance, a
child is not likely to achieve the same level of competence demon-
strated by a former law professor, whom the courts held capable of
representing himself. 55
All of the presumed vulnerabilities of youth-the inexperience,
lack of education, mature intelligence and judgment, and easy victimi-
zation portrayed in the analysis of Supreme Court cases analyzed in
part II-support appointment of counsel for minors. The very char-
acteristics that are frequently held to diminish children's legal rights
indicate that children cannot present their own court cases and there-
fore ought to have a special claim to appointed counsel. These charac-
teristics establish that, in most instances, minors lack the ability to
gather facts and deal with issues, handle their cases, understand legal
issues, or conduct cross-examination without guidance from an attor-
ney. Youth itself may be regarded as "a special factor" suggesting that
appointment of a lawyer will make a just determination more likely.
Youth is frequently a form of judicial shorthand for characteristics
that interfere with the ability to prosecute a claim. Indeed, the highest
court of California has expressly found that "a minor may be pre-
sumed to lack the ability to marshal the facts and evidence, to effec-
tively speak for himself and to call and examine witnesses, or to
discover and propose alternative" solutions to the problem before the
court.
156
153. Id. at 156; see also Maclin, 650 F.2d at 889 (remanding for appointment of
counsel because, among other things, plaintiff had no workable knowledge of the
legal process).
154. The flexibility inherent in these standards would permit a finding that an ex-
ceptionally gifted child did not require counsel. See, e.g., Brown v. Enzyme Dev. Div.
of Biddle Sawyer Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1025,1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (declining to appoint
counsel for a woman in light of her "particularly able representation of herself").
155. Hudak v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 586 F.2d 105, 106-07 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979), cited in Castner v. Colorado Springs Cablevision, 979
F.2d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1992); see also In re Fitzgerald, 167 B.R. 689, 690, 692-93
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (denying bankruptcy counsel to incarcerated debtor with law
degree).
156. In re Antoine C., 230 Cal. Rptr. 738, 739 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting In re Roger
S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1296 (Cal. 1977) (holding that counsel must be appointed to repre-
sent minors in hearings prior to psychiatric commitment under state law)). The court
in Antoine rejected the state's claim that appointed "counsel" may be a nonlawyer. Id.
at 740.
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B. Legal Interests Too Important to be Left to the Advocacy of Lay
Adults are Too Important to be Left to the Advocacy of
Children Themselves
The reasoning that leads courts to discourage pro se litigation is
closely related to the rationales adduced in favor of prohibiting unli-
censed lay persons from appearing for others in legal proceedings.
The underlying assessment of the relationship of lay adults to the legal
system common to discouraging pro se litigation and forbidding unli-
censed representation lends further support to appointing counsel for
minors.
Above all, the practice of law may be nearly unfathomable to the
uninitiated. As the Supreme Court noted in Argersinger v. Hamlin,'
157
"'t]hat which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the
untrained layman may appear intricate, complex andmysterious.' "158
If this observation is true for adults, it must be even more so for chil-
dren. When the uninitiated appear in court, the results are potentially
dangerous. One federal court compared the ban on lay persons ap-
pearing for others to the reasoning behind regulation of boating
safety: "[L]itigation is akin to navigating hazardous waters; federal
courts are willing to allow individuals to steer their own boats, and
perhaps founder or run aground; but federal courts are not willing to
permit individuals to risk the safety of others' boats." 159 The govern-
ment requires licenses to captain certain crafts and denies those
licenses to minors based on their age. To carry the analogy further, if
a minor embarks on a treacherous boat trip to a destination that he or
she has chosen, a qualified adult will be needed to captain the boat.
Federal courts that have considered the question have uniformly
held that non lawyer parents appearing pro se may not represent their
children in court even where the interests of both parents coincide
perfectly with those of their children. 60 Several courts have held that
parents cannot waive their children's right to counsel in civil litigation
because" '[t]he right to counsel belongs to the children.' ,,161 Further-
more, the courts can appoint attorneys to protect the children's right
157. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
158. Id. at 32 n.3 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938)).
159. Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(appointing counsel for a severely disabled infant under § 1915).
160. See icL at 172; Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College, 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir.),
motion to proceed in forma pauperis denied, 502 U.S. 979-80 (1991); Cheung v. Youth
Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that parent may not proceed
pro se on child's behalf, but that no counsel should be appointed where the claim
appears meritless); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 17(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1654).
161. Brown, 868 F. Supp. at 171 (quoting Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 883). Brown is
distinguishable in several respects from the norm examined by this Article. First, the
child in Brown was an infant who could not articulate her views, and who suffered
"permanent brain injuries" which made it unlikely that she would ever become com-
petent to direct litigation on her own behalf. Id. at 169. Second, nothing in the record
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to counsel.162 Indeed, courts consider children's independent right to
representation to be so important that in some instances they have
also appointed a guardian ad litem to direct the course of the litigation
where the attorney and the parent disagree.
163
Parents who demonstrate high levels of competency and capacity in
their general life skills and attainments are not exempt.164 The Third
Circuit made this principle clear in a case involving a tort claim on
behalf of the children of a "well-educated economist" appearing pro
se.165 The court of appeals vacated the judgment below against the
children on the ground that the nonlawyer father was not entitled to
represent his children.166 The father lost a jury trial and then missed
the deadline for preserving his right to request reconsideration.
167
The fact that even this highly competent father allowed a deadline to
pass underscores why children need licensed attorneys.168 It also
helps to explain why appellate courts have found reversible error
where trial courts allowed parents to proceed pro se on behalf of their
children. If the interests of children are too important to be left to the
advocacy of unlicensed adults, it stands to reason that they are too
important to be left to the advocacy of children themselves.
69
IV. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN CHILDREN AND PRISONERS: TiH
RIGHTS OF PETITION AND ACCESS IMPOSE AFFIRMATIVE
OBLIGATIONS ON THE STATE TO ASSIST
PETITIONERS IN CUSTODY
The young African American poet Sapphire likens childhood under
the constant scrutiny of adults to time spent in prison: "If you've ever
been in prison or in your parents' house, you know what it's like.'
170
She is not the only one to take this view. The majority of the current
Supreme Court agrees. In the Court's hands, the comparison is used
to denigrate the liberty interests of children.
suggested that the interests of the child diverged in any respect from those of her
father.
162. Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61.
163. Meeker, 782 F.2d at 155 (appointing guardian ad litem to form independent
assessment of children's claims in action against protective services agency),
164. Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882-83.
165. Id. at 882.
166. Id. at 883:
167. Id. at 880.
168. See id. at 882-83.
169. This argument does not reach the question of whether minors have a lesser
right to represent themselves than adults, should they choose to do so. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (1988) (creating a statutory right for litigant to represent himself). Adult de-
fendants in criminal actions also have a right under the Sixth Amendment to repre-
sent themselves. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
170. Polished Sapphire, The New Yorker, Dec. 25, 1995 & Jan. 1, 1996, at 6, 6 (quot-
ing Sapphire, There's a Window, in American Dreams (1994)).
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In Schall v. Martin'71 the Supreme Court proclaimed that children's
liberty interests are "qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody."' 72 According to Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Schall, this observation justi-
fies preventive detention of juveniles accused of delinquent acts under
circumstances that would violate the Due Process Clause if applied to
adults. 73 The Schall majority denied that such cavalier detentions
amounted to punishment, even for juveniles ultimately discharged or
released on probation. 74 Although Justice Marshall's dissent derides
the majority's comparison of detention and parental custody as "diffi-
cult to take seriously,' 1 75 the Court continues to equate children with
prisoners in other contexts, an analogy that normally diminishes chil-
dren's rights.'76
For example, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 77 a recent
case, the Supreme Court upheld random (i.e., suspicionless) urinalysis
for drug testing of student athletes. 78 The majority opinion, written
by Justice Scalia, minimized the liberty interests of children on the
grounds that the children had been "committed to the temporary cus-
171. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
172. Id. at 265 (finding that preventive detention of juveniles under circumstances
that would be impermissible if applied to adults does not violate the Due Process
Clause); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995)
("[M]inors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-including
even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, Le., the right to come and go at will.");
Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993) (upholding detention of undocumentedimmigrant children on the grounds that children "'are always in some form of cus-
tody' " (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984))). Contra Flores, 113 S. Ct.
at 1455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Court has "rejected" the assertion that
a child has a right "not to liberty but to custody" (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17
(1967))).
173. 467 U.S. at 288-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 750-52 (1987) (finding that pretrial detention of adults requires a full hear-
ing at which the government must show by clear and convincing evidence, among
other things, probable cause that defendant committed a serious crime, that defend-
ant has a serious criminal history, and that no conditions of release can adequately
protect the public).
174. 467 U.S. at 272-73. Ironically, Schall demonstrates that the presence of coun-
sel, required in the cursory hearing that leads to pretrial detentions of juveniles, is not
necessarily a protection against injustice. See id- at 279; id at 305-06 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (referring to one detention hearing as a "parody of reasoned
decisiomaking").
175. Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1447 (holding that undocumented immigrant chil-
dren have no right to be held in a noncustodial setting pending hearings because
under Schall, juveniles "are always in some form of custody" (citation omitted)). But
cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669, 682 (1977) (noting that "[t]he prisoner and
the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances," but declining to require ad-
ministrative safeguards to protect children from excessive punishment in the public
school setting).
177. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
178. Id. at 2396.
1996] APPOINTING COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION 1603
tody of the State as schoolmaster. ' 179 Justice Scalia emphasized re-
peatedly that "the most significant element in this case" is the
government's custodial relationship to students, thus "caution[ing]
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass
constitutional muster in other contexts."' 0 In a cogent dissent, Justice
O'Connor laid bare the implications of the majority opinion. The ma-
jority, she charged, had come a long way from the Court's statement
in the 1985 case of New Jersey v. TLO'8 ' that it was "not yet ready to
hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment."o sa Calling the Court to account for its cur-
rent reasoning, she pointed out that the only case with a comparable
holding involved prisoners. 183
For purposes of this Article, this author shall take seriously the
analogy of children to prisoners. Although the author does not in fact
accept the analogy between children and prisoners as developed by
the current Supreme Court,184 the analogy points the way toward an
expansion of children's rights in the limited context of claims to coun-
sel. Many of the adult plaintiffs found to have a strong claim to coun-
sel under § 1915 were prisoners; 8 5 the fact of their incarceration was
179. Id. at 2391; see also id. at 2392 (emphasizing that schools are "custodial" (cit-
ing New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985))).
180. Id. at 2396.
181. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
182. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting TLO, 469 U.S.
at 338-39). Justice Marshall played on the emerging analogy in his dissent in Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), where he echoed Justice Fortas's observation in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
that children do not shed their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate, id. at
506, and stated that "a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights at the
prison gate." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 581 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding suspicion re-
quirement impracticable in the context of searches of prisoners for contraband follow-
ing contact visits because the observation necessary to form suspicion would disrupt
"the confidentiality and intimacy that these visits are intended to afford," and distin-
guishing cases relied on by the majority (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979))).
184. Even its architect, Chief Justice Rehnquist, does not always take the analogy
seriously. He apparently has reserved the right to distinguish between children whose
liberties can be constrained under Schall because they are "always in some form of
custody," and those whose interests can go unprotected because they find themselves
in the "free world" outside the custody of the state. An example of the latter was
toddler Joshua DeShaney. Joshua's father beat him so severely that the resulting
brain damage is expected to result in his life-long confinement to an institution for the
profoundly retarded. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 193 (1989). Although state child welfare authorities were aware that Joshua was
at risk and could have protected him but failed to do so, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote an opinion for the majority that held that "the State had no constitutional duty
to protect Joshua." Id. at 201. For a discussion of the inconsistencies between Chief
Justice Rehnquist's positions in Schall and DeShaney, see Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambi-
tion, Formalism and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1513,
1519-21 (1989).
185. See supra notes 130-55 and accompanying text.
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found to pose an insurmountable barrier to their own effective fact-
finding.18
Prisoners have a constitutional right to affirmative assistance from
the state, sometimes including appointed counsel, in order to pursue
their civil claims.187 If all children are prisoners, as the analogy would
have it, then all children may have a constitutional right to counsel in
order to pursue meritorious civil litigation.
A. The Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts
The right of access to the courts is derived from the First Amend-
ment right to petition the governmenti1a-nan often overlooked liberty
interest-as well as from the Due Process Clause. The Supreme
Court has expressly held that prisoners "retain [the] right of access to
the courts."' 89 The Court has explained that "[I]ike others, prisoners
have the constitutional right to petition the Government for redress of
their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the
courts."' 90 The range of civil claims that can arise during a prisoner's
186. See, e.g., Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1994) (addressing
difficulties in fact-finding faced by incarcerated parties who represent themselves);
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that "[prisoner's] incar-
ceration may have limited his ability to engage in factual investigation"); Maclin v.
Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding that district court should
have appointed counsel where prisoner was "in no position to investigate facts ger-
mane to his complaint"). Even outside the prison context, courts have noted that
§ 1915 must be understood to guarantee indigents "meaningful access" to the courts
as understood in the cases discussed supra at notes 130-55 and accompanying text
regarding prisoners' rights. See Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir.
1986).
187. See infra notes 188-209 and accompanying text.
188. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
(citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549
(1941)). The Supreme Court has also found roots for the right of access in the Equal
Protection Clause. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 21 n.8 (1989).
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging ... the right of the people.., to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. Few commentators have discussed the right to
petition, either independently or in relation to other expressive rights guaranteed
under the First Amendment. A notable exception is Julie M. Spanbauer, The First
Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a
Different Cloth, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 15, 17 (1993) (arguing that the right to peti-
tion has been largely forgotten, but is historically a distinct and even superior right to
the other expressive rights); see also Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridg-
ing... ". An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1153, 1180-83 (1986) (arguing that the right to petition is a nearly abso-
lute right upon which courts should not place limitations).
189. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15, 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969)); see Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) ("It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts."); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941)
("[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair [the prisoner's] right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.").
190. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (citing Avery, 393 U.S. at 485).
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incarceration is by no means limited to claims related to confinement,
but rather resembles in breadth the variety of claims minors may
bring. A prisoner "may have grievances of a civil nature against those
outside the prison. His imprisonment may give his wife grounds for
divorce and be a factor in determining the custody of his children; and
he may have pressing social security, workmen's compensation, or vet-
erans' claims."''
Access to the courts for pursuing any of these civil claims, in addi-
tion to collateral challenges to confinement itself,19 must be "mean-
ingful."'193 But prisoners may be hampered in pursuing legal claims
because of the conditions of their confinement, and may be hampered
so severely that the discretionary appointment of counsel by the
courts is insufficient to insure their right of access to the courts.
In Bounds v. Smith, 94 the Supreme Court held that the right of
access to the courts imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to
assist prisoners who wish to prosecute civil claims, an obligation which
the state does not have with regard to other citizens.' 95  Under
Bounds, government must insure that inmate access to the courts is
"adequate, effective and meaningful.' 96 To insure meaningful access,
prisons must provide inmates with "adequate law libraries or ade-
quate assistance from persons trained in the law."'197
Bounds and its progeny expressly state that the Constitution does
not impose any one mechanism on the state for fulfilling its affirma-
tive obligation to assist prisoners in pursuing their right of access to
191. Avery, 393 U.S. at 493 (Douglas, J., concurring). The right of access for prison-
ers extends to civil actions, as well as to actions challenging the underlying conviction.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579-80.
192. In the case of a minor, the analogy leads to a petition for emancipation, or a
claim to have the court respect a child's expressed preferences regarding custody or
visitation. See Cummings, supra note 88, at 3.
193. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977) (noting that" 'meaningful access' to
the courts is the touchstone" (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)
(rejecting a constitutional right for indigent defendants to appointed counsel for dis-
cretionary appeals because pro se appellants can rely on legal documents and re-
search prepared below))).
194. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
195. Ia at 828.
196. Id. at 822.
197. IL at 828 (reaffirming Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971)). It should be
noted that one of the dissents in Bounds was authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, and
that, with the exception of Justice Stevens, none of the Justices who signed Justice
Marshall's majority opinion remain on the bench today. This situation is true, of
course, of many of the decisions on which this Article relies. These decisions none-
theless retain their value as precedents. Even if they did not, it would remain a legiti-
mate intellectual approach to rely on the decisions as logical building blocks in a
search for principles under the common law. See Jamie Kalven, Introduction to Harry
Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America at xx (1988) (noting
that in Harry Kalven's view, the tradition of insights and arguments is indelible, even
if new precedents supercede the old).
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the courts; flexibility is the hallmark.198 States are not required to
provide appointed counsel, to provide the assistance of paralegal as-
sistants or law students, to ensure access to jail house lawyers, or even
to maintain a law library in each prison.' 99 While each of these forms
of assistance promotes meaningful access to the courts, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the measure of what is required varies with
the facts.10 In the case of children, however, the instant analysis indi-
cates that adult counsel is needed to achieve meaningful access be-
cause of the very attributes that have been associated with children
since Blackstone first referred to their peculiar vulnerabilities 201-in
particular, their lack of fully developed intelligence, education, and
literacy.
Courts emphasize the limited capacity of prisoners to explain why
prisoners need additional assistance to achieve meaningful access to
the courts. In upholding a right to the help of so-called jail house
lawyers, the Supreme Court observed that the prison population in-
cludes many who are "totally or functionally illiterate, whose educa-
tional attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.
202
Children and prisoners share a low level of education which inhibits
their ability to express ideas in writing or explain their cases clearly.
According to the Correctional Education Association, seventy percent
of adult inmates have not completed high school and more than sev-
enty-five percent read at or below the eighth grade level, rendering
them "functionally illiterate. '20 3 The particularly low level of educa-
tion among prisoners has contributed to a determination that provi-
sion of a law library, without more, fails to ensure meaningful access
to the courts.20 4 Judicial descriptions of prisoners often bear remarka-
ble similarities to descriptions of the young.
Clearly, the characteristics of children are to some extent the char-
acteristics of vulnerability in all its guises. Vulnerable groups-includ-
ing children, persons with special needs, and those with mental
disabilities-like other disadvantaged groups in our society, may re-
quire special consideration from the courts in order to realize their
rights. Therefore, courts have held that certain classes of vulnerable
persons require special services tailored to their differing abilities in
order to level the playing field and assure that access to the courts is
198. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 824-25, 828.
199. Id. at 825.
200. lId at 825, 830-32.
201. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
202. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
203. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Posner, Prisoners, and Pragmatism, 66 Ttl. L. Rev.
1117, 1143 & nn.124 & 126 (1992) (citing Important Information About Correctional
Education in the United States Today at 1 (Correctional Educ. Ass'n Laurel, Md.)).
204. Canterino v. Wilson, 562 F. Supp. 106, 110 (W.D. Ky. 1983), motion to amend
denied, 644 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Ky. 1986), aff'd, 875 F.2d 862 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 991 (1989).
[Vol. 641606
1996] APPOINTING COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION 1607
truly meaningful.20 5 Examples of especially vulnerable adults include
illiterate or non-English speaking prisoners, 0 6 committed mental pa-
tients,2 °7 and residents of women's prisons who lack a jail house law-
yer to assist them with filing papers.20 s In each instance, the claim to
special legal services-including appointed counsel-rises to constitu-
tional dimensions.0 9
The analogy between children and prisoners is both metaphoric and
literal. The view of children as prisoners functions as a metaphor for
powerlessness and lack of control. When the courts invoke this equiv-
alence to justify limitations on liberty, children may justifiably ask the
courts to adhere to the principled consistency that law normally de-
mands. Consistency would require the courts to grant children the
small advantages resulting from the analogy. But in other respects,
the analogy may be taken more literally. It is the job of adult guardi-
ans to subject children to restrictions that free adults would not nor-
mally tolerate-such as restrictions on daily schedules and on where,
when, and with whom the child may come and go and for what pur-
pose. Under extreme circumstances, these restrictions may result in
conditions that construct a more literal parallel between childhood
and prison, as when parents interfere with communications and other
activities that may be prerequisites to the pursuit of legal claims.
Consideration of the activities that courts have found to constitute
an unwarranted interference with prisoners' rights of access supports
this more literal parallel between children and prisoners. Courts have
condemned a range of intrusions into prisoners' claims, all of which
require little creativity to imagine as parental intrusions. These intru-
205. Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1157-58 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
206. Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 719, 721 & n.21 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that
prisoners who do not speak English or are illiterate need legal assistance, not just
access to a library, to achieve the fundamental right of meaningful access to the
courts); Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259, 288 n.35 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (reaffirming
need for special legal services for non-English speaking prisoners), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1005 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that law libraries without further legal assistance are inadequate to assure illiterate
prisoners or these who lack "the intelligence necessary to prepare coherent plead-
ings" meaningful access to the courts), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1415 (1993); United
States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
207. Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856, 858 (10th Cir. 1985), cited in John L. v. Adams, 969
F.2d 228, 234 n.6 (6th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, No. 91-6241, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
23378, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 1992); Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201, 1208 (7th Cir.
1983).
208. Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1096-97 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
209. Courts have pointedly described the idea of giving vulnerable, uneducated
prisoners access to law libraries without any further assistance as the moral and prac-
tical equivalent of "furnishing medical services through books like: 'Brain Surgery
Self-taught' ... along with scalpels, drills, hemostats, sponges and sutures." Kane, 656
F. Supp. at 1105 n.2 (quoting Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D.N.J.
1982)).
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sions include interference with mail,"' ° confiscation or destruction of
legal papers,211 and interference with telephone privileges related to
legal matters.21 2 While parents do not constitute the State, parents do
retain the ability to interfere with access to the courts and some un-
doubtedly will try to do so. The presence of assigned counsel for chil-
dren may mitigate some of the barriers to being heard that parents
can erect.
Similarly, factors that lower courts have considered in assessing the
extent of a state's affirmative obligation to assist prisoners in ob-
taining access to the courts include the following: (1) the duration of
confinement; (2) the nature of the legal rights at issue; and (3) the
number of inmates likely to require a certain form of legal assistance
during the period of confinement at issue.21 3 Because the Supreme
Court has labeled minority itself as a form of confinement, if a legal
issue springs from one's status as a minor, the duration of confinement
will last as long as the legal controversy, but the issue will be moot by
the time it can be resolved absent interference because a child will
outgrow the status of being a minor. To the extent that the number of
plaintiffs in each specific instance of civil litigation is small, and de-
pending on the number of plaintiffs who reside in private homes, pro-
vision of counsel may be the least expensive, most efficient means of
assuring access to the courts, comparing favorably with, for example,
creation of law libraries.2 i4
Acknowledgment of limited resources on the part of the State can-
not change the underlying analysis. As the Supreme Court empha-
sized in Bounds, cost may be considered in crafting relief, but "the
cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total de-
nial. '21 5 In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court considered the related
issue of when courts should appoint counsel for adults charged with
misdemeanors. 1 6 Justice Powell recommended in his concurrence
210. See, e.g., Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1970) (addressing refusal
to mail prisoners' letters).
211. See e.g., Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(holding that confiscation or destruction of prisoner's legal paper violates his right of
access to courts under federal law (citing Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th
Cir. 1986); Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1986); Tyler v. "Ron"
Deputy Sheriff or Jailer/Custodian of Prisoners, 574 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1978);
Hiney v. Wilson, 520 F.2d 589, 591 (2d Cir. 1975))).
212. Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that restrictions
on or interference with telephone calls to attorneys violates prisoners' rights of mean-
ingful access to the courts).
213. See Berry v. Department of Corrections, 697 P.2d 711, 714 (Axiz. Ct. App.
1985) (citing Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322, 332, 333 (5th Cir. 1975); Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1977)).
214. If access to computerized legal data bases were free and available in school
libraries, the balancing might have a different result if some minors were deemed
capable of using such systems to perform meaningful legal research.
215. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825.
216. 407 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1992).
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that triage in deference to limited resources be guided by three factors
that bear a remarkable resemblance to those applied by lower courts
under § 1915. These factors include (1) the complexity of the legal
and factual questions, (2) "the likely consequences" of an adverse de-
cision, including serious consequences other than confinement, and
(3) individual factors such as "the competency of the individual... to
present his own case." '217 Emphasis on the third prong-the individ-
ual's competency to present his own case-is likely to result in ap-
pointment of counsel for minors.218
B. Minors in Custody Have a Right of Access to the Courts that is
Coextensive With the Right as Applied to Adult Prisoners
Only three courts have expressly considered the right of access as
applied to minors.2 19 All three decisions held that the scope of the
right of access for minors in custody is coextensive with the right of
access as applied to incarcerated adults, and that the right imposes
affirmative obligations on the state.22°
In 1977, a Mississippi federal district court held in Morgan v.
Sproat' that juveniles committed to a state training school, "no less
than adult offenders, are entitled to reasonable access to the
courts. '22 The court found that mere provision of a law library would
not suffice to protect the rights of the youngsters before it. The court
explained that even if the juvenile facility had a law library, which it
did not, "without assistance the students could not make effective use
of legal materials." 223 Evidence that sixty-five percent of the residents
were "of subnormal intellectual capacity" was merely one of the fac-
tors leading to that conclusion. 24 Other factors that the court consid-
ered significant included "the students' ages, their lack of experience
with the criminal system, and their relatively short confinement
[which] means that [in contrast to adult facilities] there cannot be a
system of writ writers .... ,2
The Morgan court did more than recognize an abstract right to
counsel; it approved a consent decree designed to ensure that the right
translated into reality. The consent decree required the training
217. Id. at 64 (Powell, J., concurring).
218. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
219. See John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1992); Germany v. Vance,
868 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1989); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D. Miss.
1977). The sole commentator on access to the courts does not discuss the application
of the concept to juveniles. See Spanbauer, supra note 188, at 43-49.
220. See John L., 969 F.2d at 233, 235; Germany, 868 F.2d at 16; Morgan, 432 F.
Supp. at 1158-59.
221. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
222. Ia at 1158.
223. Id.
224. Id at 1158 n.60.
225. I at 1158.
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school to notify all current and future residents that they were entitled
to contact specific legal services organizations for assistance by means
including conspicuous posting of legal services available to resi-
dents.116 Finally, the order required the institution to facilitate access
to counsel by assisting residents in writing requests for representation
and delivering the requests innmediately to the appropriate legal serv-
ices program 2 7
The Sixth Circuit squarely confronted the relationship between the
right of access and the right to counsel for collateral and civil claims
by juveniles in the 1992 case of John L. v. Adams.2 8 The court ex-
pressly held that juveniles incarcerated in a state training institution
have a constitutional right of access to the courts under Bounds; the
fact of incarceration, the court held, is far more important to the de-
termination of inmate rights than age.'2 9 But when age entered the
calculation, this factor reinforced the young people's claim before the
court. 3 The Sixth Circuit held that the youth and inexperience of the
litigants in John L. indicated that they required more than a library to
achieve meaningful access to courts.2 31 The court further held that
meaningful access meant nothing less than "access to an attorney.'
' 232
The Sixth Circuit in John L., however, distinguished between two
categories of claims: those that impose an affirmative obligation on
the state to assist prisoner access, and those that the state is merely
barred from impeding.233  The court also limited the children's right
226. Id. at 1159. The court also noted that in contravention of In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967), many of the children had not received representation at the hearings which
led to their commitment, and might therefore be detained illegally. Morgan, 432 F.
Supp. at 1158.
227. Id. at 1159.
228. 969 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1992). To the author's knowledge, only one commenta-
tor has discussed John L. See Karen B. Swenson, John L. v. Betty Adams: Taking
Bounds in the Right Direction for Incarcerated Juveniles, 24 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 429
(1994).
229. See John L., 969 F.2d at 233.
230. See id. at 234; Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 999 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
only especially vulnerable adult prisoners-such as the illiterate or unintelligent-
require availability of legal assistance in addition to law libraries in order to achieve
meaningful access to the courts, but distinguishing juveniles, who, as a class, cannot
achieve meaningful access to the courts "absent access to an attorney").
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 235. The district court in John L. enumerated appropriate issues for
evaluation by attorneys compensated by the state, including: (1) the duration and
conditions of confinement; (2) Eighth Amendment claims whether based on "deliber-
ate indifference" or cruel and unusual punishment; (3) "unconstitutional conditions of
confinement"; (4) due process claims; (5) equal protection claims; (6) departmental
transfers giving rise to a liberty interest; (7) other claims providing the basis for an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (8) claims "involving... program and education
issues." Id. at 231.
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to counsel by restricting the right to federal habeas corpus and civil
rights claims.-' 4
The Sixth Circuit read Bounds as extending the right of access only
so far as to encompass potential claims related to incarceration. 5
The court held, therefore, that the state had no duty to assist prisoners
in prosecuting other civil claims, such as those concerning education
or treatment under state law.- 6 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
it crafted this distinction in large part due to its concerns over the
difficulty of drawing reasonable lines limiting the state's affirmative
obligations. 237 The court noted: "[W]ere we to hold that the right of
access extends to state law treatment and education issues, we see no
logical end to the matters on which similarly situated groups of plain-
tiffs could demand access to an attorney[,] . . . [including]
emancipat[ion] from their parents...."238 Therefore, the court ruled
that the right to affirmative assistance did not extend to civil matters
involving purely issues of state law.239
The John L. ruling, however, is an unjustifiable narrowing of the
holding in Bounds. The Supreme Court had no occasion in Bounds to
consider the requirements for access to courts in diverse actions. On
the contrary, the Court expressly reaffirmed that the right of access
applies to a broad range of civil claims.2 a° Moreover, an inherent limi-
tation on access to the courts is imposed by the requirements of Rule
234. Ik at 234.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 234-35.
237. See id. at 237.
238. Id. As the argument in this Article makes clear, the Sixth Circuit correctly
perceived the difficulty of drawing boundaries so that the right of counsel would apply
only to some categories of claims. The error in the court's analysis is the assumption
that lack of resources may justify artificially truncating constitutionally mandated
rights. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
239. Id. Courts in other jurisdictions disagree and expressly hold that the right of
access applies to state as well as federal courts, and to state as well as federal claims.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833 (1977); Washington v. Meachum, No. 534616, 1995
Conn. Super. LEXIS 849, at *87 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 1995) ("It is clear beyond
doubt that both the state and federal constitutions guarantee prisoners a right of ac-
cess to the courts.").
The sole commentator on John L. argues correctly that the Sixth Circuit defined the
scope of the right of access more narrowly than Bounds requires. See Swenson, supra
note 228, at 468-71 (arguing that counsel should be appointed for state law civil claims
by juvenile inmates and that appointment of counsel should continue beyond the fil-
ing stage, but voicing justifiable skepticism that current practice will result in such
appointments and that the Supreme Court as currently composed will require such a
result). Bounds expressly did not require "any particular element"-including coun-
sel-but mandated a package of services appropriate to the specific situation and ren-
dering access to the courts meaningful. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832. Moreover, the
facts in Bounds concerned "in large part... original actions seeking new trials, re-
lease from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights." Id. at 827.
240. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 833 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to "prisoner[]
claims in state or federal courts"); id. at 828-29 (citing Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S.
15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).
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11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, in turn, by the roots of
Rule 11 in the right of petition.241 Historically, the right to petition
did not extend to "frivolous, vexatious petitions," which the govern-
ment retained the power to sanction.242 Courts thus retain the power
to deny the right of access to petitioners pursuing frivolous claims.
The First Circuit extended the right of access to minors in the cus-
tody of noninstitutional state facilities in Germany v. Vance243 -a case
which reminds us forcefully that parents and guardians do not always
speak for their children. The case involved sixteen-year-old Suzanne
Germany who was committed to the custody of the Massachusetts De-
partment of Youth Services ("DYS") following a charge that she had
assaulted her father.24 Suzanne was never incarcerated. 45 Although
in DYS custody, Suzanne lived, at various times, with her parents, in a
foster home, and with a friend.2' Shortly after Suzanne entered DYS
custody, her mother confessed to Suzanne's DYS caseworker that the
father had fabricated the assault in order to obtain DYS services for
Suzanne. 47 DYS failed to inform Suzanne of this exculpatory
evidence."
Some time later, a new caseworker read Suzanne's file and notified
Suzanne that the agency was aware of her father's perjury.249 Su-
zanne, however, remained in custody, her letter to the court explain-
ing her wrongful adjudication unanswered." Only after a new DYS
supervisor himself informed the judge that the charges were false did
the judge appoint counsel for Suzanne.25 1 The attorney was able to
arrange for Suzanne to enter an independent living situation.252
Nonetheless, Suzanne subsequently remained in DYS custody for
nearly a year and was only discharged after her eighteenth birthday. 3
Applying Bounds, the First Circuit in Germany endorsed the district
court's view that
[a]n individual certainly has at least as strong a need to know the
key facts of his or her case [as to know the applicable law] in order
to determine whether a colorable claim exists. Indeed, failure to
disclose facts which are essential to an incarcerated individual's
241. See Spanbauer, supra note 188, at 58-60.
242. Id at 17 n.6.
243. 868 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).
244. Id. at 12. Suzanne pled delinquent and initially received probation under DYS
custody. Id Probation was revoked after approximately six months. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Id at 13.
250. Id
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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claim for relief may be more effective in denying access to the
courts than destroying court papers or limiting access to the mail.25 4
The First Circuit held that Suzanne had a right of access to the courts
and that under Bounds such access must be" 'adequate, effective, and
meaningful.' "255
The court rejected the state's claim that Bounds was in apposite
because Suzanne was not a prisoner and instead emphasized that "she
was at all times in DYS custody pursuant to an adjudication of delin-
quency." '25 6 Custody, the Germany court ruled, created a "special re-
lationship" that in turn prompted "a duty to take affirmative steps to
ensure [Suzanne's] continuing right of access to the courts."" 7 The
court stressed that, far from diminishing the right of access, Suzanne's
age reinforced her rights:
The fact that [Suzanne] was a minor could only serve to heighten
this responsibility....
... [Her] status as a juvenile offers no excuse....
Indeed, custodians of a minor may well have a greater obligation
to take action to ensure the minor's 'meaningful access' to the
courts than do the custodians of an adult inmate, because of the
minor's greater reliance on the correctional system for care and
protection.25 8
Although Germany did not directly concern availability of counsel, a
reading of the case in the context of other opinions on the right of
access supports a right to appointment of counsel to help pursue
claims on behalf of minors who are held in a variety of custodial
circumstances.
All three decisions analyzing the right of access as it applies to mi-
nors-Morgan, Germany, and John L.-concerned children in the
formal custody of the state. A limitation to the context of formal cus-
tody, however, would unnecessarily narrow the holdings of the three
cases. If all children are always in some form of custody, as the
Supreme Court has noted,25 9 then all children should be able to assert
a claim for affirmative assistance in pursuing access to courts for meri-
torious civil claims. For purposes of this analysis, the fact that the
child is in custody is more important than the identity of the particular
custodian. Custody impairs access to the courts, and the affirmative
obligation to facilitate access falls on the state, regardless of whether
254. Germany v. Vance, 673 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (D. Mass. 1987), vacated and re-
manded, 868 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1989).
255. Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)).
256. Id. at 14 n.7.
257. Id. at 15.
258. Id. at 15-16.
259. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1983).
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the state or an individual adult is the custodian. As the First Circuit
emphasized in Germany, custody and youth combine to heighten a
social responsibility to promote meaningful access to the courts.2 6 °
Therefore, even assuming that the Sixth Circuit was correct in John
L. regarding the limitations on the scope of the right of access,26 1 all
children would still have access to claims for potential litigation in-
volving their constitutional rights, including rights stemming from pro-
tected liberty interests. Children, as a group, are inexperienced, have
less education than the average adult, and usually lack access to lay
writ writers when they perceive their interests as diverging from those
of their parents. Furthermore, they are unlikely to be able to proceed
competently on a pro se basis. Children, as a group, "are always in
some form of custody." 62 Therefore, the precedents involving the
rights of prisoners suggest that the state may be required to provide
all children with affirmative assistance to pursue their meritorious civil
claims, including assistance in the form of appointed counsel.
V. LAWYERS APPOINTED FOR CHILDREN SHOULD SERVE AS
ATTORNEYS, NOT AS A GUARDIANS AD LITEM
In Powell v. Alabama,2 63 the Supreme Court emphasized that the
right to counsel is critical to being heard in court-especially for the
most vulnerable litigants:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail, if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelli-
gent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law.... If that be true of men of intelligence, how much
more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feebleintellect.26
This basic principle from criminal law extends logically to children be-
cause of their lack of both experience and advanced education.
Regardless of the mechanisms used to realize meaningful access to
the courts, one unifying theme emerges from Bounds and its prog-
eny-legal assistance allows the prisoner to express his or her own
claims and views to the court. The role of any intermediary between
the prisoner and the court is limited to assessing whether the merits of
a proposed claim pass the threshold requirements to survive a chal-
lenge based on frivolity. In no instance has a court proposed that the
independent judgment of an attorney, paralegal, or law student be
substituted for that of a prisoner pursuing a claim. Of course, as in all
260. See Germany, 868 F.2d at 15.
261. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
262. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
263. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
264. Id. at 68-69.
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modes of counseling, legal advisors should offer opinions and alterna-
tives for consideration by the counselee 65
Where children are concerned, however, courts and commentators
too frequently collapse the roles of attorneys and guardians ad li-
tern.266 The differences in these roles should be stark. Attorneys are
bound by professional standards that require them to pursue "the
wishes and objectives of the child where the child is capable of making
considered decisions in his [or her] own interest."' 267 The guardian ad
litem, in contrast, "presents an independent voice in the litigation, and
is charged with protecting the child's best interest [as the guardian
understands it] rather than the child's viewpoint. 261
265. James K. Genden, Separate Legal Representation for Children: Protecting the
Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 565,
589 (1976) (suggesting and perhaps going too far in doing so, that the attorney
"should be able to attempt to persuade the child that the attorney's conception of the
child's best interest is correct"). Practitioners tend to beleive that most children will
accept the advice of an attorney who discussed the alternatives with them. See Ann
M. Haralambie, The Child's Attorney: A Guide to Representing Children in Cus-
tody, Adoption, and Protection Cases 49 n.52 (1993) (discussing informal interviews
in which 45 of 47 teenagers said they would accept advice of lawyer that conflicted
with their own preferences if they believed that attorney cared about them). The
same may well be true of many adult clients.
266. See Haralambie, supra note 265, at 2-14 (discussing the frequent role confusion
in practice).
267. Mark Hardin, Guardians Ad Litem for Child Victims in Criminal Proceedings,
25 J. Fam. L. 687, 690 (1986-87) (citing Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating
to Counsel for Private Parties, Standard 3.1(b) (1980); Lawyer's Manual on Profes-
sional Conduct 31:601-08 (1986); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-12
(1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1983); In re Genusa, 381 So.
2d 504 (La. 1980); Ariz. State Bar, Ethics Op. 86-13 (1986)); see also Proposed Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in
Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 Fam. L.Q. 375, § I.A-1 (1995) [hereinafter Proposed
Standards] (" '[C]hild's attorney' means a lawyer.., who owes the same duties of
undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due
an adult client.").
Difficult questions concerning who should assess the child's capacity, how capacity
should be determined, and to what extent the wishes of a child with borderline capac-
ity should be considered are beyond the scope of this Article, but are addressed else-
where in this issue and in other works. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of
the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity,
17 Fam. L.Q. 287, 320 (1983) (recommending that lawyers should represent a "capa-
ble" child client's wishes in a protection proceeding and proposing that lawyers
should presume that children age seven and older are capable); Robyn-Marie Lyon,
Note, Speaking for a Child. The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L.
Rev. 681, 693, 700-01, 706 (1987) (arguing that attorneys should take direction from a
minor client if the minor is competent to give such direction); Katherine H. Federle,
Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce
Proceedings, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1523, 1562-63 (1994) (discussing the widespread con-
fusion concerning the role of appointed counsel for children and the distinctive roles
of attorney and guardian ad litem even among proponents of independent representa-
tion of children).
268. Hardin, supra note 267, at 689; see also Proposed Standards, supra note 267,
§ I.A-2 (stating that a guardian ad litem shall "protect the child's interests without
being bound by the child's expressed preferences").
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The applicable professional standards require attorneys serving as
attorneys to advocate the competent client's position as defined by the
client-including child clients.2 69 As summarized in one recent arti-
cle, "Most recent sets of Standards seem to advance a model of repre-
sentation that is substantially identical to that for an unimpaired adult
when the child is able to give direction to the attorney ... ."70 Even
the Standards promulgated by the American Academy of Matrimo-
nial Lawyers for proceedings involving custody and visitation, which
are premised on the idea that neither counsel nor guardians ad litem
should be routinely appointed for children in such proceedings, state
that where lawyers are appointed, unimpaired clients of any age have
the right to set the goals of the representation.271 Many experts agree
that:
[A] lawyer appointed or retained to serve a child in a legal proceed-
ing should serve as the child's lawyer[,] ... not.., as the child's
guardian ad litem.... The lawyer for a child who is not impaired
... must allow the child to set the goals of the representation as
would an adult client2 72
Some, however, worry about allowing an attorney to advocate a
child's viewpoint when the attorney perceives the viewpoint to be
wrongheaded. The basis for this concern includes role identification
with parents, distrust of children, a sense that children are inherently
less "rational" than adults, and an implicit acknowledgment that even
adults, with their additional life experience, do not always accurately
identify their own best interests, much less act on them. 73 Attorneys,
however, may not be competent to substitute their own judgment for
that of their clients. Attorneys may lack specialized training or exper-
tise in assessing the variety of emotionally charged issues likely to
come into play in litigation involving a child's life choices. These is-
sues include choosing a preferred guardian, preferences regarding visi-
tation, the need for medical or psychiatric care, reproductive choice;
269. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.2(a), 1.14(a) (1983); Model
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1981).
270. Shepherd & England, supra note 15, at 1941; see also id. at 1934-41 (reviewing
professional standards including the Institute for Judicial Administration/American
Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards (1979), the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (1969), and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(1983)).
271. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children: Stan-
dards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings
Standards 1.1, 2A (1995).
272. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 21, part I.
273. See generally Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representa-
tion-The Proper Roles of Children, Parents and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y 423 (1993) (arguing that parents have a right to direct the course of their
child's representation and proposing that the Model Rules be amended accordingly).
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and the long term practical effects and psychological implications of
such choices. 74
Perhaps even more important, the controversies that trigger this
analysis of the attorney's role arise in the context of a well-established
justice system characterized by a belief in the adversary system. The
lawyer's role is to tell the client's story as persuasively as possible, not
to make ultimate decisions. The role of decision maker is reserved for
the trier of fact. The lawyer can thus rest easy in the knowledge that,
at least in theory, if both sides present their best arguments to the
court, the trier of fact will be better equipped to render an intelligent
decision.
The presence of counsel minimizes the risk that a court would dis-
pense "assembly-line justice."2 75 The cursory nature of proceedings
for lesser offenses, which the Supreme Court has noted often are
"characterized by insufficient and frequently irresponsible preparation
on the part of the defense, the prosecution, and the court," do not
diminish the need for counsel, but make it even more pressing.27 6 If,
as the Supreme Court has held, dramatic improvements result when
attorneys are provided for adults,277 it is even more important to pro-
vide children with counsel to ensure that their voices are heard before
critical decisions concerning them are made.
Ideally, appointment of counsel for the child would result in the
court hearing well-reasoned arguments for every viewpoint. The
court would then apply the appropriate legal standard. Our justice
system rests on the assumption that the adversary system encourages
the best expression of each position. Based on that foundation princi-
ple, and knowing that the judge will decide the matter, a lawyer for a
child may pursue the child's preferences without undue angst.278
274. Attorneys' general training fails to prepare them for the exigencies of repre-
senting children, including communication with child clients. Furthermore, attorneys
frequently are confronted with clients who communicate indirectly or not at all re-
gardless of their competency. Again, representation of preverbal clients raises sepa-
rate issues.
275. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972). Of course, this premise de-
pends on the idealistic hope that children will receive more than "assembly line" rep-
resentation from properly trained lawyers with reasonable case loads.
276. Id. at 35-36 (quoting William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misde-
meanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 Legal Aid Brief Case 151, 152 (1970)).
277. See id. at 36.
278. The Proposed Standards, supra note 267, part I.B-4., recognize that circum-
stances may arise in which the attorney's assessment of the child's best interests differ
to such an extent with the view expressed by the child that the attorney perceives a
conflict. Even under such circumstances, the Standards require the attorney to con-
tinue to press the child's case, but allow the attorney to "request appointment of a
guardian ad litem [to serve in addition to the attorney] without revealing the basis for
the request." Proposed Standards, supra note 267, § I.B-2 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
The questions of when and why counsel should be appointed for
children lie at the hearf of all dialogue about ethical issues in repre-
senting children. 79 This Article has explored those questions in light
of existing jurisprudence governing adults' rights to counsel in the civil
context.
The presumption of vulnerability has been central to jurisprudence
about children. Blackstone drew on an important-but limited-
truth in observing that children's capacities differ in various respects
from those of adults. Up through our own time, courts have focused
on various aspects of that "difference"-children's susceptibility to
victimization; their lack of experience, fully developed intelligence.
and education; and their limited capacity to grasp legal rights and the
consequences of waiving them. Whatever role the law has played in
constructing that understanding of childhood, those vulnerabilities
cannot be denied, and are more than simple social constructions.
But those vulnerabilities should not be understood only as disabili-
ties that justify outsider status and voicelessness. To the contrary, as a
rich group of cases holding that counsel should be appointed for
adults who are unable to pursue their own claims attests, the vulnera-
bilities of children support the appointment of counsel for children
who are incapable of making considered decisions. Such appoint-
ments are especially vital when liberty interests are at stake. Ap-
pointing counsel is also crucial when the court suspects that the
interests of parents and children may not coincide. In certain respects,
the analogy of child to prisoner is more metaphoric than literal. But
to the extent that the Supreme Court has held that the status of, a child
resembles that of a prisoner, and that children in fact lack certain per-
sonal freedoms, the child's claim to appointed counsel may rise to the
level of a constitutional claim to affirmative assistance to achieve
meaningful access to the courts.
Recognizing children's need for counsel in civil litigation promotes
both procedural and substantive justice. This Article has focused pri-
marily on the normative values served by appointing counsel for chil-
dren. But the instrumental results of expanding the voice of the
vulnerable may also be significant. Appointing counsel allows the vul-
nerable to present their best arguments to decision makers whose au-
thority is backed by the coercive power of the state. It reduces the
risk of an arbitrary decision. Appointment of counsel increases the
likelihood of an outcome consistent with the child's expressed prefer-
ences by partially redressing the imbalance of power between children
and the adults who make decisions about them. Appointing counsel
thus simultaneously enhances the likelihood of a just decision and the
integrity of the justice system.
279. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 21, part VIII.
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In contrast to children who conclude that a judge made a critical
decision about their lives without respecting their views and prefer-
ences, children who can express their views through counsel may take
solace in the rationality of the system that determined their fate-
even if the decision is not the one they sought. Children may thus
resemble prisoners in a respect not yet discussed; evidence suggests
that prisoners are more likely to accept undesirable regulations fol-
lowing a process in which they have participated." 0 The child who
has been represented by a lawyer who has heard and communicated
the child's views may cooperate more fully with the court's decree,
and render the decree more effective.' 1 But the child who feels that
the state made critical decisions about his life without respect for his
views will suffer from the additional sting of arbitrariness.
When children correctly perceive that they are unnoticed and un-
heard, the scars run deep. The narrator of Hoeg's Borderliners, who
grew up as a ward of the state in a procession of residential facilities,
vividly captures the wounds that result when children pass voiceless
through the institutions that determine their fate:
Time had wrapped a membrane around [the adults]. They were ...
pressed for time and totally unaffected by our meeting....
... Time has wrapped itself around the adults-with its haste, its
dread, its ambitions, its bitterness, and its long-term goals. They no
longer see us properly, and what they do see they have forgotten
five minutes later.
While we, we have no skin. And we remember them forever....
... We remember[ ] every facial expression, every insult and word
of encouragement, every casual remark, every expression of power
and weakness. To them, we were everyday, to us they were time-
less, cosmic, and overwhelmingly powerful. 282
As Hoeg's narrator suggests, the reasons for assuring that children
have ample voice transcend considerations of legitimacy and efficacy.
Voice cannot offer a perfect antidote to the existential vulnerability
that children experience. But voice is an essential element of the
sense of autonomous self that is critical in a society that rests on
human rights and mutual respect. In this sense, expanding children's
right to counsel in the civil context furthers two classical dimensions of
280. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 588-89 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1283 (1st Cir.
1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) ("[Flair treatment ... will en-
hance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.")).
281. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 636 n.22 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[c]hildren who felt that they have received a
fair hearing may be more likely to accept the legitimacy of their confinement, ac-
knowledge their illness, and cooperate with those attempting to give treatment"
(quoting, inter alia, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring))).
282. Hoeg, supra note 26, at 161.
1620 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
liberty. Appointment of counsel protects all individuals (and espe-
cially the weak) against arbitrary power-whether wielded by the
state or by private persons assisted by the threat of state enforcement.
More positively, it affirms the personhood of all members of society.
Ultimately, society's attentiveness to the vulnerable defines the
boundaries of our commitment to the living democratic tradition.
